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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globally harmonized prudential regulation and internationally 
driven secured transactions law reforms chart the normative premises 
sustaining credit-based economies. Oscillating between the need of 
expanding credit creation to promote economic growth and the urgency 
of controlling the excessive accumulation of debt, modern economies 
depend on private law rules and regulatory provisions that originate in 
different fora of the international lawmaking arena. Under the auspices 
and guidance of international organizations concerned with the 
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alleviation of poverty,1 a growing number of jurisdictions across the 
globe have embarked – or are embarking – upon substantial legal 
reforms to facilitate credit expansion and financial inclusion through the 
establishment of proprietary entitlements, known as “security interests” 
or “security rights,” over personal property. 2  In essence, secured 
transactions law reforms aim at equipping creditors and debtors with 
legal tools that effectively reduce credit risk by placing secured creditors 
in a priority position vis-à-vis unsecured creditors and competing 
claimants. 3  Prudential regulation, through international regulatory 
                                                                                                                              
1. The efforts to harmonize and modernize secured transactions law contribute to achieving 
the first (“end poverty in all its forms everywhere”) of the seventeen sustainable development 
goals to be reached by 2030 by the international community; G.A. Res. 70/1, at 15 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda reiterating the 
relevance of international legal harmonization to reduce poverty and inequalities; G.A. Res. 
69/313, ¶ 89 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
2. The list of countries that, in pursuit of these goals, have reformed or are in the process of 
reforming their secured transactions laws is lengthy and ranges across six continents, animating 
vibrant scholarly debates and policy analyses. For a forward-looking analysis of the development 
of secured transactions law internationally and comparatively, see generally Symposium, Secured 
Transactions Law in the 21st Century, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Charles W. Mooney, Steven 
L. Schwarcz & Giuliano G. Castellano, special eds., 2018). For a critical account of the issues 
concerning secured transactions law reforms in several jurisdictions, see generally SECURED 
FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Frederique Dahan ed., 2015). For an examination 
of the economic effect of secured transactions law reforms in developing countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, see, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and Its Poverty Reduction Effect, 
42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 727 (2007). For an analysis of the reform debate in Europe, see, e.g., Tibor 
Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt a Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-type Secured 
Transactions System? The Effects of the Differing Legal Platforms, 35 ADEL. L. REV. 149 (2014). 
For an overview of the main issues affecting the reform debate at the national level in the United 
Kingdom, see, e.g., HUGH BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED FINANCING 
¶¶ 23.01-23.22 (2d ed. 2012). 
3. The core purpose of curbing credit risk associated to secured transactions is recognized 
in virtually any legal system. In the United States, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, 
SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH xxxi (7th ed. 2012); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the 
Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646 (1997); Grant Gilmore, The Secured 
Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29 
(1951). In Canada, see RONALD C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & RODERICK J. WOOD, 
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAW 1 (2005). Under English law, see BEALE ET AL., supra 
note 2, ¶ 1.09; SIR ROY GOODE, GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY ¶ 1-01 
(Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). The core legal body of the U.N. system, i.e. United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) consider the reduction of credit risk 
associated to secured transactions as essential to promote access to credit worldwide. See U.N. 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE] (noting that “[r]isk is reduced because 
credit secured by assets gives creditors access to the assets as another source of recovery in the 
event of non-payment of the secured obligation”). 
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standards, sets forth the amount of capital that – relative to the total 
investments and in proportion to the risks acquired – regulated deposit-
taking institutions, for simplicity banks, must not fund with borrowed 
money.4 The overarching aim is to ensure that banks maintain sufficient 
funds to insulate depositors from unexpected losses and promote 
financial stability by controlling the level of risk taken by banks.5 These 
branches of law intersect when banks secure the repayment of loans with 
collateral. Yet, from a regulatory perspective, not all security rights are 
considered to offer sufficient protection against credit risk. 
An inconsistency, if not a fully-fledged paradox, surfaces in the 
international and national legal frameworks governing credit: core legal 
devices designed by private law rules to reduce credit risk may be 
considered, under capital requirements, inapt to curb credit risk and, thus, 
equated to unsecured credit. At first blush, the different treatments of 
collateral may appear symptomatic of a clash between broad policy 
objectives, namely, economic growth (stimulated through access to 
credit) and financial stability. A closer examination, however, reveals a 
tension that is more profound than a mere balancing exercise between 
two policy objectives. 
The main argument of this Article is that dissonances between 
secured transactions law and capital requirements stem from their 
different ethoi and hinder both access to credit and financial stability 
worldwide. To sustain this argument and advance the debate in both 
fields of law,6 it is necessary, first, to isolate the rationales and the 
                                                                                                                              
4. In common parlance, capital requirements are often referred to as the capital that banks 
should “set aside.” This locution should be used with the caveat that capital requirements do not 
demand banks to hold some portion of their deposits, which is what “liquidity requirements” and 
“reserves” (outside the scope of this Article) impose. Instead, capital for banks is what other firms 
term as “equity” and equity-like instruments, i.e. “own funds.” This point is eloquently illustrated 
by ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6-7 (2014). 
5 . See HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY AND REGULATION 575 (21st ed. 2016); RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & 
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 251 (4th ed. 2009); 
Michael B. Gordy, Erik A. Heitfield & Jason Wu, Risk-Based Regulatory Capital and the Basel 
Accords, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 550-66 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2014); JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 290-315 (2016). 
6. In spite of the decades-old plea for a deeper coordination, the intersection between these 
two sets of norms has not been the object of scrupulous investigations. In particular, Sir Roy 
Goode noted: “[t]he harmonisation of private law affecting credit will lose much of its value if it 
does not proceed hand in hand with harmonisation of public regulation.” Roy Goode, A Credit 
Law for Europe?, 23 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 227, 236 (1974). The debate has been recently 
reinvigorated by new evidence indicating the role of secured transactions law and capital 
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operational logics of secured transactions law and capital requirements. 
The narrative sustaining and justifying the law of secured transactions 
is rooted in the idea that security interests, especially those in personal 
property, are the core engine for economic growth as they redress the 
problem of “dead capital;”7 that is, the mismatch between the assets held 
by individuals or companies and the assets that financiers are willing to 
accept as collateral. Through this lens, international organizations have 
been actively engaged in promoting law reforms that establish legal 
regimes that facilitate the conversion of dead capital into productive 
capital. The underlying assumption is that by preferring secured 
creditors over unsecured creditors, the use of collateral is facilitated and 
more credit is extended at a lower cost. Hence, law reformers strive to 
design a legal regime in which creditors and debtors are able to negotiate 
the terms of their consensual transactions to fit their idiosyncratic 
financing needs and risk appetites, while mandatory rules are largely 
imposed having in view the effects of security rights on third parties. As 
illustrated in this Article, such a rationale permeates national laws and 
the international legal standards adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).8 
Capital requirements follow a different rationale that is 
encapsulated in their preventive, or prudential, function. They are 
defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel 
                                                                                                                              
requirements in creating credit. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: 
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3069594. UNCITRAL has recently 
recognized the relevance of the issue and future work that results in a text containing specific 
guidance to national regulatory authorities on capital requirements. See Giuliano G. Castellano & 
Marek Dubovec, Coordinating Secured Transactions Law and Capital Requirements in U.N. 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODERNISING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT 
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 166, (Vienna, 4-6 July 2017),  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/17-06783_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TGS-
79FK] (archived Mar. 1, 2018); REPORT of the U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW 
(UNCITRAL), on its Fiftieth Session (3-21 July 2017), ¶¶ 222-23 U.N. Doc A/72/17 (2017). 
7. The term was coined by the economist Hernando de Soto. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE 
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE 
ELSE (3d ed. 2000). 
8. On the origins of UNCITRAL and its early work, see generally John Carey, UNCITRAL: 
Its Origins and Prospects, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 626 (1967); Allan E. Farnsworth, UNCITRAL-
Why? What? How? When?, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 314 (1972). On the EBRD, see Steven Weber, 
Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 48 INT’L ORG. 1 (1994). 
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Committee) – housed in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – 
to ensure capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 9  When 
transposed into national legal systems, capital requirements are imposed 
on credit institutions with the intent of preventing excessive risk-taking, 
which may have detrimental implications for the stability of individual 
banks and the entire financial system.10 This translates into two main 
areas of regulatory intervention, consisting of micro-prudential and 
macro-prudential regulation, and concerning, respectively, the solvency 
of individual banks and the stability of the entire financial system. Upon 
these premises, mandatory requirements are established, imposing a 
statutory limit on the ratio of “un-borrowed” funds, such as equity, to 
borrowed funds, such as deposits. The amount and the composition of 
banks’ own capital is calculated against the risks posed by their 
operations. By controlling the risk associated with lending, capital 
requirements influence the lending choices of individual banks, which 
may divert their funds towards activities subject to lower capital 
requirements.11 
The two aforementioned rationales develop into distinctive 
operational logics. Security instruments are consensual arrangements 
established to curb credit risk. They are governed by private law rules 
that are concerned with the nexus of rights and obligations created 
through a security agreement. In contrast, capital requirements are 
regulatory provisions that focus on the internal processes that banks 
must deploy to evaluate the riskiness of any given lending operation, 
with or without collateral, in order to determine the corresponding 
capital charge. Accordingly, the law pertaining to secured transactions 
assumes that, inasmuch as private law rules are conducive to private 
negotiations, a security right reduces credit risk. Whereas, capital 
requirements are designed to control the level of risk taken by individual 
                                                                                                                              
9 . On the genesis of the Basel Committee, see CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 (2011). 
On the Basel Committee’s role within the modern global governance system, see CHRIS 
BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW AND FINANCIAL 
ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 99-102 (2014). 
10. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 87; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5, at 
550. 
11. For an accurate analysis of the incentives created by capital regulation in the context of 
the Global Financial Crisis, see generally Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International 
Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 
YALE J. ON REG. 3 (2014). See also Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal 
and Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that international capital requirements affect the 
cost of creating new loans and the lack of coordination with secured transactions law distorts the 
incentive for providing commercial loans). 
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banks and consider collateral to reduce credit risk only if specific 
statutory criteria are met. Hence, when secured transactions law and 
capital requirements are approached in a compartmentalized fashion, a 
hiatus emerges that, in turn, manifests itself in two distinct 
understandings of what constitutes an effective protection against credit 
risk. 
To address this gap, this Article examines the regulatory treatment 
of security rights in personal property with primary reference to 
international legal and regulatory standards. The provisions enshrined 
in the UNCITRAL and the EBRD model laws are measured against the 
requisites that collateralized transactions must satisfy in order to benefit 
from discounted capital charges, pursuant to the Second Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II)12 and the Third Basel Capital Accord (Basel III).13 
Given the different levels of implementation of these standards at the 
national level, different methodological approaches are required to 
investigate their interaction. Secured transactions laws of selected 
jurisdictions – belonging to civil law and common law legal families – 
are considered. Specific attention is given to legal and regulatory 
frameworks of the European Union and its Member States. In the EU, 
in fact, secured transactions laws are disharmonized while capital 
requirements are harmonized and largely based on Basel II that is, in 
turn, applied to any credit institution operating in the European single 
market through the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and 
the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).14 Where departing from 
international principles, Belgian, English, French and Italian laws 
governing non-possessory security rights over tangibles, financial assets 
                                                                                                                              
12 . BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED 
FRAMEWORK (rev. 2006) [hereinafter BASEL II]. 
13. The process to amend Basel II started in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
leading, in 2011, to the adoption of the first instrument that eventually became known as Basel 
III. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. 2011) [hereinafter 
BASEL III (2011)]. In December 2017, after extensive negotiations, Basel III has been completed 
and its final version was formally adopted. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
BASEL III: FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS (2017) [hereinafter BASEL III]. 
14. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. L 176/338 [hereinafter CRD IV]; Council Regulation 
575/2013, on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and 
Amending Regulation 648/2012, 2013 O.J. L 176/1 [hereinafter CRR]. 
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and receivables are examined through the prism of the principles 
established by the CRR. This systematic approach allows us to identify 
specific dissonances between secured transactions law and capital 
requirements. These dissonances affect the terms of a security 
agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties, the public filing 
regime for security rights and their enforcement. As illustrated in detail 
in this Article, the uncoordinated intersection between these two 
branches of law hinders the effectiveness of reforms aimed at expanding 
access to credit and inducing the development of unregulated credit 
markets. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II, in 
defining the boundaries of this investigation, unveils the hiatus between 
the rationales and the inner logics underpinning personal property 
secured transactions law and prudential regulation. Part III focuses on 
the intersection between the two areas by examining the regulatory 
treatment of security rights in receivables, financial collateral and 
tangible assets. Part IV offers an analysis of the consequences of the 
uncoordinated coexistence of secured transactions laws and capital 
requirements on access to credit and financial stability. 
II. TWO RATIONALES 
As secured transactions laws of various legal systems undergo a 
process of reform and the debate over the recently adopted revision of 
harmonized capital requirements has animated the global political 
debate, 15  the need for adequate understanding of the interactions 
                                                                                                                              
15. As a testament to their local impact, secured transactions law reforms generally hit the 
headlines in local news. The international limelight is reserved to the Basel Committee efforts to 
furthering the reforms process started in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The intention 
is to implement a package of new reforms to complete Basel III. However, the proposed changes 
have been perceived so radical that the document presented have been dubbed as Basel IV. See 
infra note 23 and accompanying text. Different rounds of negotiations, amid a mutating political 
environment, have blocked the process of changes with European countries and the U.S. often 
struggling to find an alignment. See, e.g., Caroline Binham & Jim Brunsden, France Hardens 
Stance Against Higher Bank Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/ee8f42eb-422a-3dc9-92a2-8ceb7d9fb4ef; Julia-Ambra Verlaine, 
Global Financial Regulation Faces Uncertain Future After Trump’s Order, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-financial-regulation-faces-uncertain-future-after-
trumps-order-1486405041; Caroline Binham & Emma Dunkley, Basel Postpones Bank Reform 
Vote Amid Policy Differences, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/589f1ce0-
d1a1-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51. Finally, on December 7, 2017, the oversight body of the Basel 
Committee, i.e. the Governors and Heads of Supervision, announced the completion of Basel III, 
signaling that a political agreement has been reached over the reform process initiated after the 
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between these two fields of law intensifies. The tension between the 
policy objectives pursued by secured transactions laws and prudential 
regulation offers only a superficial explanation of the chasm separating 
these two sets of legal rules.  
It is acknowledged that secured transactions law chiefly aims at 
broadening access to credit, promoting economic growth; whereas, 
prudential regulation focuses on curbing the risks associated with 
lending operations in order to ensure financial stability. However, if the 
inconsistencies resulting from this divide are reduced to a clash between 
policy objectives, advancements in the discourse would be obstructed 
by an alleged dichotomy between economic growth and financial 
stability. Following this conceptualization, swift policy 
recommendations are often advanced. Depending on the favored 
position, a relaxation of capital requirements may be suggested, 
arguably to promote economic growth, 16  or the desirability of 
comprehensive legal reforms to support credit creation may be 
questioned, supposedly with the intent of inducing financial stability. 
This understanding, however, results in a practical impasse, given that 
it is assumed that the two objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. 
More profoundly, it neglects that stability is a precondition for sustained 
growth.17 These two overarching objectives are, in fact, interwoven, as 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank highlights. 18  According to the 
                                                                                                                              
global financial crisis. See Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Governors 
and Heads of Supervision Finalise Basel III Reforms (December 7, 2017). 
16. As reported by ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 9, a plea for a relaxation of capital 
requirements is often vented by the industry. This stance is also manifested in the industry’s 
responses to public consultations concerning international capital requirements. In this respect, 
the Basel Committee often took into account whether different proposals for reform have a 
negative impact on lending to small business. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDISED APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK 
10 (2015) [hereinafter CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT]. More recently, it has been often advanced 
the idea that capital regulation is holding back economic growth by limiting lending activities or 
that with new capital requirements banks would be “forced” to limit lending activities; see, e.g., 
Gernot Heller, G20 Review of Banking Rules No Rollback of Regulation: Weidmann, REUTERS 
Mar. 19, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-germany-weidmann-idUSKBN16Q0L5 
[https://perma.cc/UW85-Z59W] (archived Mar. 1, 2018). 
17. The point is clearly illustrated with reference to the 2007-2009 financial crisis by 
ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5. 
18. See IMF, Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program: Further Adaptation to 
the Post-Crisis Era Policy Paper, (Sept. 2014), 
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FSAP, secured credit and the protection of creditors’ rights are core 
components of the legal framework sustaining the soundness of 
financial systems. 19  More specifically, a modern legal regime for 
secured transactions is considered to be a factor that facilitates stable 
economic growth and recovery, especially when it expands financing 
opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises.20 In a similar vein, 
balancing financial stability and economic growth underscores the 
definition of an optimal level of mandatory capital reserves that banks 
must hold.21 Hence, capital requirements aim at ensuring the stability of 
both individual banks and the banking system as a whole, without 
stifling banks’ ability to support credit-based economies. In the 
aftermath of recent financial crises, concerns over financial stability 
animated the international policy agenda and led to questions of whether 
capital requirements have been excessively low, thereby resulting in a 
call for the reassessment of the Basel Accords.22 Although a first wave 
of changes contained in the first Basel III instrument adopted in 2011 
addressed a number of significant issues, negotiations concerning more 
fundamental aspects have been completed only after several years of 
extensive consultations. 23  With the adoption of the final version of 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB6Z-SL5A] 
(archived Mar. 1, 2018). 
19. IMF & WORLD BANK, Financial Sector Assessment:  A Handbook 230 (2005). 
20. See Spiros V. Bazinas, Richard M. Kohn & Louis F. Del Duca, Facilitating a Cost-Free 
Path to Economic Recovery—Implementing a Global Uniform International Receivables 
Financing Law, 44 UCC L. J. 277, 279 (2012) (noting that the possibility of securing loans with 
personal property is essential to stimulate economic growth and recovery in developed and 
developing economies alike). See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, REPORT ON SMES AND 
SME SUPPORTING FACTOR (2016). In Europe, economic growth and recovery have been linked 
to the availability of financing for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), given that nine 
out of ten businesses in Europe are SMEs. On the benefits of secured transactions law for SMEs 
and micro-businesses, see Kozolchyk, supra note 2, at 731 (noting that “where commercial credit 
is available to small- and medium-sized enterprises, micro-enterprises can also become its 
beneficiaries and poverty is thereby further alleviated”). 
21. IMF, Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/16/04, (Mar. 
2016). 
22. A study conducted by IMF staff members suggests that doubling, and in certain cases 
tripling, capital requirements would have been sufficient to absorb losses in most of the past 
banking crises. Id. at 20. 
23.  During the negotiation phase, the proposals advanced by the Basel Committee were 
informally labeled as “Basel IV” in consideration of the relevance of the changes that they entailed. 
Basel IV typically indicated a package of proposed reforms contained in a series of documents. 
The most relevant set of proposals for the purpose of this investigation are contained in BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO 
THE STANDARDISED APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK (2015) [hereinafter SECOND CONSULTATIVE 
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Basel III in 2017, the Basel Committee initiated the implementation 
phase. Notwithstanding the efforts to enhance both accuracy and 
precision in the mechanisms to calculate capital requirements, the Basel 
framework for personal property collateral remains largely unaffected 
by the recent reforms and, as such, is still anchored to the framework 
established prior to the recent financial crises.  
At the root of the hiatus between the legal rules governing secured 
transactions laws and international regulatory standards are the radically 
different rationales and operational logics that generate dissonances 
when applied simultaneously, i.e. when banks act as secured creditors 
while complying with capital requirements. These two branches of law 
are both aimed at reducing credit risk, but they are characterized by 
different attitudes towards the level of risk that the banks are allowed to 
undertake, as it emerges when their core mechanisms and evolution are 
examined. 
A. Secured Transactions Law: National Reforms and International 
Models 
In recent years, national legislators have – more or less 
successfully – attempted to reorganize the maze of national rules 
governing security rights in personal property. The common 
denominator of these reforms is the pursuit of legal simplification and 
certainty through a more cohesive apparatus of rules in which 
functionally similar secured transactions are subjected to similar legal 
treatment and ultimately to a unitary legal framework. 24  Legal 
rationalization is ubiquitous in secured transactions law reforms, 
                                                                                                                              
DOCUMENT] and in the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT: REDUCING VARIATION IN CREDIT RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS – CONSTRAINTS ON 
THE USE OF INTERNAL MODEL APPROACHES (2016) [hereinafter IRB CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT]. Most of the proposals advanced by the Basel Committee, including those contained 
in the aforementioned documents, have been ultimately adopted by the Basel Committee and are 
included in Basel III. See Marcel Magnus, Benoit Mesnard & Alienor Duvillet-Margerit, 
Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to Basel IV?, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 18, 
2017), for a useful summary of the debate prior to the final adoption of Basel III.  
24. Simplification was one of the motivating objectives of the drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States; see Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying 
Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687, 690 (1948). For a cogent parallel between the 
UCC experience and the international process of harmonization and simplification of secured 
transactions law, see Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next 
Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173 (1998). 
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regardless of whether national law reformers: (1) intend to emulate the 
legal regimes of Canada and the United States that pioneered the unitary 
framework lauded by many; 25  (2) were driven by an international 
impetus involving the adoption of international standards, such as those 
elaborated by the EBRD and UNCITRAL;26 or (3) explored a different 
reform strategy.27 Even within the same region, legal frameworks are 
substantially different and countries may be at different stages of the 
reform process. In Europe, for instance, several countries have reformed 
national laws along the lines of the EBRD Model Law on Secured 
Transactions (EBRD Model Law), e.g., Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia.28 In Belgium, a new law inspired by international standards 
was recently adopted with the intent of rationalizing the regime 
established by the civil code.29 In France, the work of the Grimaldi 
                                                                                                                              
25. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 295 (1965). This 
option has influenced the debate in numerous legal systems belonging to different legal traditions. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom, see generally Iwan Davies, The Reform of Personal 
Property Security Law: Can Article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial Code be a Precedent?, 37 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 465 (1988). In Central European countries, see Tajti, supra note 2. In France, 
see generally, JEAN FRANÇOIS RIFFARD, LE SECURITY INTEREST OU L’APPROCHE 
FONCTIONNELLE ET UNITAIRE DES SÛRETÉS MOBILIÈRES: CONTRIBUTION À UNE 
RATIONALISATION DU DROIT FRANÇAIS (1997) (Fr.). Finally, in Latin America, see Marek 
Dubovec, UCC Article 9 Registration System for Latin America, 28 ARIZONA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 117 (2011). 
26. On the principles of the EBRD MODEL LAW, see infra note 42, see Frederique Dahan, 
Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The Transplantation of Secured Transactions Laws, 
2 EUR J. L. REFORM 369 (2000). For an example of the influence of UNCITRAL instruments in 
guiding national reforms, in the African context, see e.g., Marek Dubovec and Cyprian Kambili, 
Secured Transactions Reform in Malawi – The 2013 Personal Property Security Act in SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 391 (Louise Gullifer & 
Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) [hereinafter STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE]. 
27 . As an alternative to the blunt transposition of North American models, different 
strategies have been utilized. In the European context, see generally Giuliano G. Castellano, 
Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy? 78 MOD. L. REV. 611 
(2015) (indicating the reform of publicity rules, with the implementation of a filing system to 
regulate priority represents a viable reform strategy to start more comprehensive reforms in many 
European jurisdictions). 
28 . Katarína Mathernová, The Slovak Secured Transactions Reform: Ingredients of a 
Successful Reform and Reflection on its Achievements, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND 
ACCESS TO CREDIT 207 (Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008). 
29 . Loi modifiant le Code Civil en ce qui concerne les sûretés réelles mobilières et 
abrogeant diverses dispositions en cette matière [Act to Amend the Civil Code with Respect to 
Security Rights and to Repeal Various Security Provisions] of July 11, 2013, MONITEUR BELGE 
[M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 2, 2013 [hereinafter Belgian Pledge Act]. The Act is 
not fully operational yet; for a comment, see Eric Dirix, The Belgian Reform on Security Interests 
in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 27 at 391; Ivan Peeters and Michiel 
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Commission led to a partial reform of the civil and commercial codes 
and further amendments are expected to align French secured 
transactions law with the UNCITRAL Model Law.30 Similarly, in Italy, 
a new non-possessory pledge was introduced, albeit more 
comprehensive reforms are demanded by many. 31  In the United 
Kingdom, secured transaction law is not in line with international 
standards and reforms have been debated for over five decades. 32 
Although few statutory interventions have been made, the wind of 
change seems to be blowing again and new concrete proposals have 
been advanced for a more comprehensive reform of English law.33 In 
general, the number of legal systems – within and outside the European 
Union – that have adopted new laws, or are currently considering 
reforming their current legal regime to establish proprietary entitlements 
in personal property, is constantly growing. 
To North American lawyers – who are acquainted with the 
uniformity brought by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
by the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts – the lack of a 
harmonized, EU-wide legal framework for secured transactions might 
appear peculiar. In the European Union, the effort to harmonize national 
                                                                                                                              
de Muynck, Belgium Moves to Modernity but Only Half Way: The Introduction of New 
Legislation on Security Interests in Movable Assets, 29 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 75 (2014). 
30. See Jean François Riffard, The Still Uncompleted Evolution of the French Law on 
Secured Transactions towards Modernity, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 27, at 369; Muriel Renaudin, The Modernisation of French Secured Credit Law: Law 
as a Competitive Tool in Global Markets, 24 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 385 (2013). 
31. Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2016, n. 119, G.U. Feb. 7, 2016, n. 153 (It.) [hereinafter Italian 
Non-possessory Pledge Law]. For an early analysis on the reform debate in Italy, see Guido 
Ferrarini, Changes to Personal Property Security Law in Italy: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 477 (Ross 
Cranston ed., 1997). For a more recent comment, see Anna Veneziano, Italian Secured 
Transactions Law: the Need for Reform, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 27, at 355. 
32. The initiatives to reform English law may be traced back to the BOARD OF TRADE, 
REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749 (U.K.). A number of subsequent 
proposals have followed. For a complete account, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶ 23.01ff. 
33. A more comprehensive reform is advocated by the Secured Transactions Law Reform 
Project. See Secured Transactions Law Reform Project, Policy Paper, 
SECUREDTRANSACTIONSLAWREFORMPROJECT.ORG (Apr. 2016), 
https://stlrp.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/str-general-policy-paper-april-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N3H-M77R] (archived Mar. 3, 2018). Moreover, the Financial Law 
Committee of the City of London Law Society has been pressing for the implementation of a 
Secured Transactions Law Code. See Richard Calnan, A Secured Transactions Code, 30 J. INT’L 
BANKING & FIN. L. 473 (2015). 
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secured transactions laws has been confined within the European Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which in its Book IX elicits the 
core principles for a pan-European secured transactions law. 34  The 
DCFR, however, remains an academic exercise, as it has not been 
incorporated into any domestic legislation of EU Member States. Rather 
than providing a general legal framework for secured credit, EU 
legislatures have followed different avenues, harmonizing either rules 
pertaining to specific types of collateral and secured transactions or 
provisions related to areas that are contiguous to secured transactions 
law, and outside the scope of this investigation, such as retention of title 
clauses in the context of late payments and cross-border insolvency.35 
To the first category belongs the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) 
that establishes a set of rules, implemented across the European Union, 
for transactions secured with credit claims and financial collateral, i.e. 
cash and financial instruments.36 Although implemented to promote free 
movement of capital and financial stability within the European single 
market, the FCD touches upon some of the core aspects of national 
secured transactions laws. 37  Aside from some aspects concerning 
financial collateral, in the EU, secured transactions are governed by 
national laws. Court interpretations, doctrinaire constructions and 
statutory provisions define the traits of a variety of consensual 
instruments that secure the fulfillment of an obligation through an 
entitlement over collateral in every European Union jurisdiction. 
Charges, contractual liens and pledges are some of the fundamental 
security instruments encountered in European legal systems to take 
                                                                                                                              
34. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2010) (2009) [hereinafter 
DCFR]; See generally ULRICH DROBNIG & OLE BÖGER, PROPRIETARY SECURITY IN MOVABLE 
ASSETS (2015). 
35. For an overview and critique of the EU legislative efforts to offer a harmonized legal 
framework for secured transactions, see Anna Veneziano, European Secured Transactions Law 
at a Cross-Road, in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL 
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 405ff (Louise Gullifer & Stefan Vogenauer eds., 
2014). On the EU cross-border insolvency regime, see generally Gerard McCormack, Something 
Old, Something New: Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation, 79 MOD. L. REV. 121 
(2016). 
36. Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on 
Financial Collateral Arrangements as Regards Linked Systems and Credit Claims, 2002 O.J. L. 
168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC, 2009 O.J. L. 146/37 and by Directive 2014/59/EU, 
2014 O.J. L. 173/190 [hereinafter FCD]. 
37. On the issues related to the implementation of the FCD, see e.g., Louise Gullifer, What 
Should We Do About Financial Collateral?, 65 C.L.P. 377 (2012). 
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personal property as collateral.38 The list further expands when title-
based financing, such as financial leases and retention of title clauses, 
are considered. 39  Hence, with few and limited exceptions, like 
Belgium, 40  European legal systems have not attempted to adopt a 
unitary, functionally-based approach and different legal categories and 
security instruments often coexist at the national level. 
1. The Rationale of Secured Transactions Law: Party Autonomy and 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
Absent an internationally harmonized secured transactions law, its 
ethos is to be sought in the core areas that are common to any legal 
framework regulating security rights over personal property. These 
areas pertain to: (1) the creation of security rights over a wide range of 
assets without dispossession of the debtor; (2) the priority status of 
security rights against competing claims; (3) the enforcement of security 
rights through judicial or extra-judicial mechanisms; and (4) the public 
disclosure of the potential existence of security rights. 41  In general 
terms, promoting private negotiations is the primary rationale of secured 
transactions law. Hence, party autonomy represents a fundamental tenet 
that permeates, to a different extent, all these four areas. Nonetheless, 
limits to contractual autonomy result from a balance, underscoring 
various legal rules, among the interests of the parties affected by the 
security instrument. The provisions elaborated by UNCITRAL offer a 
privileged perspective to illustrate these points. 
                                                                                                                              
38. See, e.g., Castellano, supra note 28, at 614-16 (noting that even if even if the commercial 
use of these different security instruments is substantially similar, considerably different legal 
rules apply, depending on the formal categorization of each and every instrument). 
39. On the variety of instruments belonging to this category, see 2 PHILIP R. WOOD, 
COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE ¶¶ 33-003ff (2007). On 
leasing in US law, see Peter W. Schroth, Financial Leasing of Equipment in the Law of the United 
States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2010). 
40.  On the Belgian reform, see generally, supra note 30. 
41. These core elements emerge from various international standards. See Core Principles 
for a Secured Transactions Law, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., 
http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395238854769&d=&pagename=EBRD%2
FContent%2FDownloadDocument (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR REGIMES (2016); UN COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE (UNCITRAL) LEGISLATIVE GUIDE. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2010). In the literature, 
see John Armour, The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons for European 
Lawmaking? in THE FUTURE OF SECURED CREDIT IN EUROPE 14 (Horst Eidenmüller & Eva 
Maria Kieninger eds., 2008). 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions 
(UNCITRAL Model Law) – adopted in July 2016 – epitomizes the 
ongoing effort to assist national law reformers in “modernizing,” to use 
UNCITRAL’s terminology, their secured transactions laws.42 The pivot 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law is the extensive deference to party 
autonomy. Following a unitary, functionally-based approach, any 
proprietary entitlement in personal property (movable assets) “that is 
created by an agreement to secure payment or other performance of an 
obligation” is considered a security right, regardless of the denomination 
attributed to it by the parties.43 This means that consensual security 
instruments performing similar economic functions are subjected to the 
same legal treatment and the parties to a security agreement are not 
required to establish the correct formal qualification of their transaction 
in order to determine the relevant legal treatment. 44  Additionally, 
minimal requirements are imposed to create a security right. For 
instance, a general description of the encumbered assets is sufficient.45 
The principles of party autonomy and minimal formalities influence 
different rules, such as those governing perfection, i.e. effectiveness 
against third parties, and the enforcement of security rights. Parties are, 
thus, free to choose either control or registration to perfect their security 
                                                                                                                              
42. UNCITRAL’S terminology differs from the one adopted by North American legal 
systems. For instance, in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, “security interests” 
are referred to as “security rights,” “secured parties” as “secured creditors,” “collateral” as 
“encumbered asset,” and “debtor” as “grantor.” MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 102, 
9 (UNCITRAL 2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]. 
43 . UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 2(ii). The EUREuropean Bank for 
Reconstruction & Dev., Model Law on Secured Transactions does not adopt a functional 
approach. Instead, art. 6.1 recognizes three types of charges: a registered charge, an unpaid 
vendor’s charge and a possessory charge. See MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6.1 
(EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. 2004) [hereinafter EBRD MODEL LAW]. Likewise, 
the DCFR follows a functional approach, whilst distinguishing between “security right in 
movable assets” and “retention of ownership devices.” DCFR supra note 35, ch. IX, § 1. In 
contrast, the Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 30, retained the traditional nomenclature of security 
rights, including the terms and concepts of pledge (droit de gage/pandrecht), retention of title 
(réserve de propriété/eigendomsvoorbehoud) and legal lien (droit de rétention/retentierecht). 
44. STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 84-85 (6th ed. 2015); ANTHONY J. DUGGAN & 
JACOB S. ZIEGEL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, TEXT, AND 
MATERIALS 20-21 (6th ed. 2013). For an argument to extend the scope of application beyond the 
functional equivalents to long-term leases and commercial consignments, see Catherine Walsh, 
Transplanting Article 9: The Canadian PPSA Experience, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 49, 83-85. 
45. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 6 & 9; See EBRD MODEL LAW, supra 
note 44, art. 5.5. 
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rights in financial collateral. 46  In turn, registration, for any kind of 
collateral, follows a notice-filing approach, whereby a standardized 
form requiring skeletal information suffices to achieve perfection. 47 
Therefore, the registry represents a tool to promote private negotiations 
by publicizing the potential existence of a security right and by generally 
determining the priority following the first-to-file principle. 48  Party 
autonomy is buttressed not solely by provisions affecting the secured 
creditor-debtor relationship, it also extends to the relationship between 
two secured creditors who might consensually alter their order of 
priority, i.e. in a subordination agreement. 49  Hence, the underlying 
rationale of the Model Law is that by establishing a simplified set of 
rules that clearly defines the rights and obligations of the parties entering 
into, or affected by, a secured transaction, private negotiations are 
facilitated. In this regard, parties are free to satisfy their idiosyncratic 
interests and risk appetites. 
2. Beyond Party Autonomy: Balancing Conflicting Interests 
National legal regimes may depart from the principles enshrined in 
the UNCITRAL or EBRD model laws. Nonetheless, a common 
operational logic may be isolated. The various rules regulating creation, 
perfection, priority, and enforcement of security rights are ultimately 
concerned with striking a balance among (often) antithetic interests of 
three categories of affected parties, namely debtors, secured creditors 
and competing claimants who may be buyers of the collateral and 
creditors who have acquired an interest in the collateral under a court 
decision. In addition, national bankruptcy laws insert into the mix 
another category of competing claimants, i.e. preferential, or statutory, 
                                                                                                                              
46. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 26; DCFR, supra note 35, ch. IX, § 
3:204. FCD states: “Member States shall not require that the creation, validity, perfection, 
enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement or the provision 
of financial collateral under a financial collateral arrangement be dependent on the performance 
of any formal act.” FCD, supra note 37, art. 3. In Belgium, a security right in receivables may be 
perfected by control when the secured creditor notifies the receivables obligor. See Belgian Pledge 
Act, supra note 30, art. 60. 
47. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 18; DCFR, supra note 35, ch. IX, § 
3:102(1). 
48. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 19(2), 23 & 24; DCFR, supra note 
35, ch. IX, § 4:101(2). 
49. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 41; DCFR supra note 35, ch. IX, § 
4:108(1). 
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claimants, which include employees for owed wages and tax authorities. 
As different interests are balanced, party autonomy results necessarily 
limited. The degree of this limitation varies across legal systems. 
In consideration of the historical and cultural contexts in which a 
given rule developed, a greater level of protection to one of these 
categories is granted. A few examples will illustrate this point. In North 
American legal systems, the concept of “commercial reasonableness” 
serves as a check against the great degree of freedom accorded to 
secured creditors to determine the method and manner of disposition of 
the collateral. 50  Under English common law, the core distinction 
between floating and fixed charges has been developed by courts 
precisely to balance different interests. 51  In fact, a charge is 
characterized as floating if the debtor maintains control over the 
collateral. However, in such a circumstance, the secured creditor (charge 
holder) enjoys a lower priority status, as compared to the holder of a 
fixed charge, and part of the charged assets must be apportioned to 
unsecured creditors.52 Another example of this balance is offered by the 
rules concerning the rights of buyers over encumbered assets sold 
outside the ordinary course of business. Pursuant to Article 26 of the 
Model Registry Provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law, a security 
right is not extinguished when the encumbered asset is sold by the debtor 
outside the ordinary course of business without the authorization of the 
secured creditor. However, if further proprietary entitlements are 
created on the same asset, striking the balance between different 
interests becomes more problematic. If the buyer creates a security right 
in the purchased asset in favor of another creditor, the buyer’s secured 
creditor would encounter difficulties in ascertaining the existence of 
prior security rights because searching the registry against the identifier 
of the buyer would not disclose the encumbrance created by the seller 
of the asset.53 Hence, the rule that allows for a security right to continue 
without an amendment of the registered notice that adds the buyer as the 
new grantor after the collateral has been transferred favors the first 
                                                                                                                              
50. CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 29; HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 45, at 
638. 
51. On the distinction between floating and fixed charges, among others, see GOODE, supra 
note 3, at 136. 
52. Insolvency Act, 1986 (as amended), c. 45, § 175 & 176A, sch. B1, ¶ 65(2) (Eng.) 
[hereinafter Insolvency Act]. 
53. UNCITRAL, GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS REGISTRY 51-
52 (2014) [hereinafter REGISTRY GUIDE]. 
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secured creditor over the transferee’s secured creditors. The logic of this 
rule is that the transferee’s secured creditor should have conducted due 
diligence beyond the registry record. However, the desire to protect the 
secured creditors of the buyer, inter alia, has led legislators to design a 
rule that imposes a duty on the secured creditor of the seller to amend 
the registered notice within a period of time after the sale of the asset.54 
Further limits to party autonomy emerge in different contexts. For 
instance, civil codes belonging to the Romano-Germanic tradition often 
limit secured creditors’ freedom to secure their loans with excessive 
collateral. 55  Although common law systems typically allow secured 
creditors to avail themselves of any remedies set forth in the security 
agreement,56 in civilian traditions, enforcement rules and procedures are 
often statutorily determined and may not be waived by the parties.57 
Limitations to contractual freedom as a result of a balancing exercise 
among different interests also emerge from the discussion concerning 
the ability to create a security right in receivables when a ban on 
assignments has been agreed upon by the debtor and the obligor of the 
receivable, i.e. those who owe payment on a receivable. When a ban on 
assignment is statutorily overridden, the legal regime privileges – at the 
expense of the parties’ contractual freedom – the interests of debtors, 
                                                                                                                              
54. See CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 263. Moreover, Walsh notes that 
“…requiring the record to be updated only once actual knowledge is acquired would seem to offer 
sufficient protection to subsequent secured creditors.” Walsh, supra note 45 at 75. 
55. A practice known as overcollateralization. See Tajti, supra note 2, at 175; Brinkmann, 
The Peculiar Approach of German Law in the Field of Secured Transactions and Why it has 
Worked (So Far), in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 339, 346. 
56. This is the case in English Law. See GOODE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 4-65. Contrast with Part 
6 of UCC Article 9 that “departs from the UCC’s general emphasis on freedom of 
contract…contains a number of rules that cannot be waived or varied.” HARRIS & MOONEY, supra 
note 45, at 578. 
57. This is the case for Italy, where enforcement mechanisms are established by the law and 
vary depending on the security instrument deployed. The new non-possessory pledge allows 
secured creditors, if expressly established in the agreement, to retain possession of the 
encumbered assets or dispose of them, provided that debtors are compensated for any profit 
exceeding the secured value. See Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 32, art. 1(6). 
Moreover, DCFR ch. IX, § 7:101(2) requires that a security right is perfected before the secured 
creditor may enforce it if third parties are involved. Furthermore, § 7:102 states that: “As between 
the enforcing secured creditor and the security provider, the rules of this Chapter are mandatory, 
unless otherwise provided.” 
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who may then assign receivables irrespective of a restriction stipulated 
by the agreement that generated such receivables.58 
In consideration of the variety of legal solutions stemming from 
the rationale and the operational logic underscoring secured transactions 
regimes, international soft-laws represent a consensus among various, 
domestic legal doctrines and approaches.59 Such a consensus, achieved 
in United Nations’ boardrooms populated by commercial law lawyers, 
is now tested against the requirements of prudential regulation. In fact, 
whilst the rules pertaining to secured transactions reflect a balance 
among the interests of different parties, it remains to be ascertained 
whether a given rule favoring one of the affected parties is to be 
preferred from a prudential regulatory perspective. Addressing this core 
question will lead to a reconsideration of well-established legal 
principles, such as those defining the priority status of floating charges 
or the desirability of bans on assignments. More profoundly, it emerges 
that informed analyses of secured transactions law and its reform require 
taking into account the regulatory dimension affecting the extension of 
credit through the banking system. 
B. Prudential Regulation: Crisis-driven International Standards 
Prudential regulation, as it is the case for most regulatory 
interventions, performs an ambivalent role by accommodating 
conflicting interests with the objective of mitigating the risks associated 
with activities otherwise beneficial for society, like the extension of 
credit. Unlike other businesses however, banks are highly leveraged, 
with low levels of equity, and thus particularly exposed to the risk of 
default.60 Within a fractional-reserve system, banks hold only a portion 
                                                                                                                              
58. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 13. For the UK law, see Michael Bridge, 
The Nature of Assignment and Non-assignment Clauses, 132 L. Q. R. 67 (2016), noting that “the 
expected secondary legislation nullifying non-assignment clauses will restore the marketability 
in the area of receivables financing.” 
59. For an early contribution on the difficulties in reaching a consensus in this area, see 
Ulrich Drobnig, Study on Security Interests, 8 UNCITRAL Y.B. 171, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/131 
(1977) (and Annex). 
60. This is an inner feature of the banking business. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 
4, at 51; CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 4, at 252; and JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 291 (noting that if banks were wholly funded by equity and in their balance sheets only 
liquid assets were permitted, they would not be able to operate and extend credit to the economy). 
As shown in detail in this Section, capital regulation is concerned precisely with reducing banks’ 
leverage and ensuring sufficient liquidity of banks, by increasing the amount of own funds. 
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of the capital raised and convert most of it into means of production.61 
Long-term investments, like loans, are thus funded largely by short-term 
liabilities, like deposits.62 As a result of this maturity mismatch in the 
balance sheets, banks are required to manage a variety of risks, most 
importantly, credit risk, i.e. the risk of borrowers not repaying their long-
term obligations,63 and liquidity risk, i.e. the risk of not having sufficient 
cash to meet short-term obligations. 64  Moreover, given the inner 
complexities characterizing modern banking activities, banks are 
increasingly more exposed to operational risk that is represented by the 
potential loss resulting from failures in internal processes and systems 
(including those deployed to manage the aforementioned risks) or from 
external events. 65  Failures in the management of those risks may, 
                                                                                                                              
61. Traditional accounts indicate that banks are intermediaries, implying that new loans are 
created inasmuch as deposited savings are available. However, central bankers and leading 
economists have indicated that deposits are created through loans. This is because every time a 
loan is created a new deposit is also established. Given that deposits represent purchasing power, 
commercial banks in essence create money, broadly conceived. See, e.g., Michael McLeay et al., 
Money creation in the modern economy (BANK OF ENG, Quarterly Bulletin 2014. Q. BULL. 2014); 
Todd Keister & James J. McAndrews, Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves? 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 380, (2009). The limits to deposit creation 
(through loans) relates to market pressures and monetary policy constraints. See James Tobin, 
Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” (Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, 
Discussion Paper No. 159, 1963) (indicating reserves as one of the limits to the creation of loans). 
In legal scholarship the point has been noted by several commentators pointing at profound 
implications for financial regulation. See Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, The Finance 
Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) (describing the banking system as a public-private 
partnership in which public actors accommodate and monetize private liabilities); MORGAN 
RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) (defining the 
relationship between banking, financial instability, and private money creation as the “money 
problem”); and Dan Awrey, Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective 
Framework for Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934 (2017) (noting 
that, in the context of the Eurodollar market, the ability of financial institutions to create currency 
liabilities impacts on the ability of central banks to provide assistance in case of liquidity shortage). 
62. Even if banks do not lend out deposits, but they create credit, deposits can still be used 
to fund loans. Simply, the amount of savings held by a bank does not represent per se a limit to 
the banks’ ability of creating loans. For a discussion on this point and its implications on capital 
regulation, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory 
Incentives, supra note 6. 
63. Credit risk is defined as the risk that borrowers may not meet their obligations and 
relates to non-trading activities. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR 
THE MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT RISK 1 (2000). 
64. For an overview of the different connotations of liquidity in the banking system, see 
Kleopatra Nikolaou, Liquidity (Risk) Concepts: Definitions and Interactions (Eur. Cent. Bank, 
Working Paper No. 1008, 2009). 
65.  See BASEL III, supra note 13, at 128. 
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depending on various factors, result in the default of individual banks 
with negative implications for depositors, other creditors and for the 
“real economy,” i.e. the part of the economic system concerned with the 
production and the trade of goods and services. Similarly, economic or 
financial turmoil may distress individual banks, generating an adverse 
feedback loop, whereby a diffused accruement of credit risk and a 
decline in available liquidity, due, for instance, to a contagion effect, 
hinder banks’ ability to manage risk and in turn exacerbate economic 
downturns.66 In his seminal work, Hyman Minsky advanced the idea 
that financial instability is a cyclical phenomenon that escalates through 
different phases fueled by an uncontrolled accumulation of debt that 
may become excessive and eventually cannot be repaid.67 Thus, the 
effective management of credit risk and maintenance of sufficient 
liquidity are essential for both the proper functioning of banks and the 
stability of the financial and economic systems. 
The core mechanism to manage those risks is represented by banks’ 
own funds that are traditionally divided into economic capital, 
determined by banks, and regulatory capital, prescribed by regulators.68 
While banks have developed sophisticated techniques to calculate 
economic capital, the limited liability structure, together with corporate 
governance and compensation mechanisms, may incentivize managers 
to hold less capital.69 Given that own funds are more expensive than 
                                                                                                                              
66. The literature on bank crises is vast. Contagion is generally indented as a herd behavior, 
whereby investors (or depositors) simultaneously withdraw funds from financial institutions, 
regardless of whether those institutions are in distress. Thus, bank failures are not contingent on 
insolvency. Contagion is, in fact, a liquidity crisis, inherent to the financial institutions financed 
through short-term borrowing. See generally HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: 
PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016) (highlighting that contagion has been 
the most destructive phenomenon in financial markets and played a critical role in the 2008 
financial crisis). For the economic literature on the interplay between financial stability, liquidity 
and credit risk, see generally Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Shortages 
and Banking Crises, 60 J. FIN. 615 (2005). 
68. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, CAN “IT” HAPPEN AGAIN? ESSAYS ON INSTABILITY 
AND FINANCE (2015) (1982). Similar considerations have been advanced by CHARLES P. 
KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (1978). 
69. The distinction is ubiquitous in financial economics. See generally George G. Kaufman, 
Capital in Banking: Past, Present and Future, 5 J. FIN. SERV.. RES. 385 (1992). See FRANS DE 
WEERT, BANK AND INSURANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 21 (2011); PIETER KLAASSEN & 
IDZARD VAN EEGHEN, ECONOMIC CAPITAL: HOW IT WORKS AND WHAT EVERY MANAGER 
NEEDS TO KNOW 2 (2009). 
70. See INTERIM REPORT TO THE G7 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS (Financial Stability Forum 2008). For lucid analysis of the relationship between 
bank’s corporate governance and financial stability, see Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, 
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borrowed funds,70 management is incentivized to decrease the level of 
protection and instead engage in investments that maximize 
shareholders’ value and returns in the short term. This may result in 
excessive risk-taking, insufficient liquidity, and, ultimately, 
undercapitalization. It is precisely in an effort to address these issues 
that further mandatory requirements impose on banks an additional 
layer of capital, known as “regulatory capital.”71 Historically, regulatory 
capital – mirroring the role of economic capital – has been devised to 
perform a micro-prudential function; namely, to decrease the odds of an 
individual bank’s failure, both by strengthening its ability to absorb 
unexpected losses and by preventing excessive risk-taking. 72  As 
demonstrated by the treatise of the recent developments in international 
capital requirements, prudential regulation has been increasingly geared 
to address the overall stability of the banking system. 73  Hence, the 
resulting regulatory framework is aimed at ensuring the soundness of 
individual banks (micro-prudential regulation) and the entire banking 
system (macro-prudential regulation) by controlling the amount of funds 
that banks can convert into investments. 
                                                                                                                              
Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic 
Relationship, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2015). For a behavioral approach explaining the incentives 
to acquire excessive risk, see Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural 
Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009). 
70. The Modigliani-Miller theorem on corporate finance posits that the value of a firm is 
not affected by its capital structure. Hence, whether a firm deploys primary equity or debt does 
impact, or has a minimal impact, on the cost of financing. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. 
REV. 261, 265-81 (1958). However, it is commonly recognized that for banks debt is less 
expensive than equity, due to lower taxes attached to debt instruments and because deposits are 
protected by, implicit or explicit, public guarantees. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 310-
311; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 110-11. 
71 . See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory 
Incentives, supra note 6, at n.60 and accompanying text, indicating that given that banks are 
considered to create credit, capital regulation represents a tool to control the creation of credit 
(and thus of debt) in the economy. 
72. On the distinction between micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation, see infra 
note 106 and related treatise in the text. In general terms, the role of capital requirements is 
ascribed to the preventive function of prudential regulation, whereby rules are established to 
ensure the soundness of financial institutions. See ROSS CRANSTON, EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, 
KRISTIN VAN ZWIETEN, CHRISTOPHER HARE & THEODOR VAN SANTE, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 
LAW 31 (3d ed. 2018) (noting, inter alia, that prudential regulation comprises the rules “to keep 
financial institutions safe and as a going concern”). 
73. See id and infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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The preventive rationale of prudential regulation is reflected in the 
provisions establishing minimum capital requirements. In general terms, 
a bank’s regulatory capital should be, at any point in time, equal to (or 
greater than) a minimum level that is set through a fixed percentage of 
the bank’s overall economic resources, including loans and other 
investments. Because the value and the exposure associated with banks’ 
investments are floating, the amount and the composition of regulatory 
capital vary widely over time. For each and every lending operation, 
banks should calculate a capital charge, which is a percentage of the 
total amount of regulatory capital and is determined in proportion to the 
level of risk, i.e. exposure, posed by that operation.74 The basic formula 
to compute capital charges thus multiplies the regulatory capital 
percentage by the risk-weighted coefficient that is determined for any 
given lending operation. The operational logic characterizing this 
process may be defined as risk-based. This means that capital 
requirements are crafted to ensure that higher risk exposures result in 
higher risk-weighted coefficients and thus higher capital charges. It 
follows that, differently from what has been noted for secured 
transactions law, in prudential regulation, the level of risk taken by 
banks is a matter of law and is governed through the statutory provisions 
prescribed by capital requirements. 
1. International Capital Requirements: Evolution and Current 
Approach 
Following a series of bank failures in the 1970s, the Basel 
Committee was tasked with the drafting of harmonized standards 
ensuring capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 75  The 
centerpiece of this effort is reflected in the Basel Capital Accords, 
representing an internationally coordinated set of administrative rules. 
Even though the Accords, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, are not 
legally binding under international law, they have been implemented as 
                                                                                                                              
74. For a discussion on the basic principles applicable to computing regulatory capital, see 
DE WEERT, supra note 69, at 75; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5, at 552. 
75 . In particular, the Basel Committee was established in response to the failure and 
liquidation of the Herstatt Bank in 1974. The Herstatt Bank was liquidated by German authorities 
before it could satisfy its obligations owed to American counterparties. Its collapse was followed 
in the same year by the failure of the Franklin National Bank in New York, with ripple effects on 
international financial markets. See BRUMMER, supra note 9, at 99; GOODHART, supra note 9, at 
31-35. 
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binding rules in most jurisdictions.76 Since the First Basel Accord (Basel 
I), adopted in 1988, the definition of minimum capital requirements has 
followed a tortuous path of multiple refinements, political compromises 
and critiques. 77  Basel I – through a relatively straightforward 
methodology – achieved the primary objective of imposing a minimum 
threshold for regulatory capital (at eight percent). However, 
discrepancies in national implementations and the lack of sufficient risk-
sensitivity to compute capital charges ultimately undermined its 
effectiveness – particularly with respect to maintaining consistency 
across jurisdictions – and led to its revision and replacement with the 
adoption of Basel II.78 
Basel II, initially published in 2004 and further revised in 2006, 
introduced a three-pillar structure.79 The first pillar defined new capital 
requirements, refining and expanding the risk-weighted method with the 
inclusion of new and adjusted parameters for various risk-exposures and 
a menu of three methodologies that banks could employ to determine 
their regulatory capital. Under the basic methodology, drawn from Basel 
I and referred to as “standardized approach,” Basel II has statutorily 
prescribed the risk-weight parameters to calculate capital charges in 
accordance to the riskiness of various operations. 80  With the 
introduction of two additional Internal Rating-Based (IRB) 
methodologies,81 banks have been allowed, upon regulatory approval, 
to adopt their own models to adjust the risk-weighted coefficients and 
                                                                                                                              
76. For a progress report on the implementation of the Basel framework, see BASEL COMM. 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs247.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z48V-B5YB] (archived Mar. 3, 2018). 
77. For a critical appraisal of BASEL II and its development, see generally DANIEL K. 
TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(2008). 
78.  Id at 122. 
79. See BASEL II, supra note 12, at 6. Although in the European Union every bank operating 
in the single market was subjected to Basel II, in the United States, small banks were exempted 
and have been regulated under Basel I. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 605. 
80. For a comparison of the different risk-weightings set forth by Basel I and Basel II, see 
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 588-92 and 596-601; see also Kern Alexander, The Role of 
Capital in Supporting Financial Stability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 344 (Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015). 
81. The two methodologies are the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (F-IRB) and the 
Advanced Internal Rating-Based (A-IRB). The latter allows banks to determine most of the 
parameters of the formula to calculate capital charges. 
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ultimately benefit from lower capital charges. In other words, in an 
attempt to alleviate the costs of compliance and monitoring, the 
introduction of IRB methodologies has elevated the models used by the 
industry for the calculation of economic capital to legal standards for the 
computation of regulatory capital.82 
The use of internal models to determine regulatory capital was a 
novelty in banking regulation. Today, it represents a rather established 
regulatory technique adopted not only in financial regulation, known in 
the literature as “meta-regulation” or “enforced self-regulation.” 83 
Regulators, instead of prescribing how regulated entities should comply 
with regulatory principles, require regulated entities to, first, develop 
their own mechanisms for compliance and, second, to prove the 
effectiveness of such mechanisms to regulators. In the context of capital 
regulation, the reason for involving regulated institutions in the 
regulatory process is twofold. First, there is an inherent benefit in 
building upon the knowledge and the expertise of the banking industry, 
given that regulators necessarily rely on practices developed by 
regulated entities to devise effective regulatory action. Thus, rather than 
imposing prescriptive rules that may be inflexible, the possibility of 
developing internal models to meet capital requirements aims at 
increasing the responsibility of regulated banks by incentivizing them to 
develop processes that both fit within their internal organizational 
structures and ensure regulatory compliance. Second, the expected 
lower capital charges resulting from the adoption of their own models 
                                                                                                                              
83. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: AN 
EXPLANATORY NOTE (2001) [hereinafter AN EXPLANATORY NOTE]. 
83 . Self-enforced regulation has been approached as a technique that transcends the 
traditional dichotomy between self-regulation and prescriptive regulatory standards and has been 
defined as a form of “subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors.” IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 103 (1992). The sectors where meta regulatory 
approaches have been adopted for some time are many and include food and industrial safety as 
well and environmental protection and pollution control. See generally Cary Coglianese & David 
Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public 
Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). For a critical assessment of meta-regulation in the 
context of international financial regulation, see Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New 
Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (2012) (also 
noting that the arguments in support of meta-regulation are grounded on the idea that it enables 
firms to embed compliance mechanisms within their organisational structure, placing on them the 
responsibility to demonstrate compliance, rather than requiring regulators to demonstrate lack of 
compliance). In general, also after the recent financial crises, meta-regulatory techniques are 
widely used to define the system of corporate governance and control of banks. See generally IRIS 
HY CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL 
IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015). 
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and estimations – provided that they are approved by regulators – should 
incentivize banks to strengthen their risk management practices, 
resulting in greater resilience.84 
The introduction of Basel II was controversial and, as the 2007-
2008 crisis unfolded, the Accord proved to harbor deep conceptual and 
operational flaws. A series of issues also emerged with respect to the 
reliance on internal models to calculate regulatory capital. Although 
large banks welcomed with favor the introduction of the internal model 
approach, the financial crisis revealed a series of weaknesses. First, there 
was the suspicion that banks could manipulate the IRB variants to 
benefit from lower charges without effectively curbing risks.85 Second, 
the quality of internal data appeared questionable, given that the limited 
timeframe considered was inadequate to reflect systemic shocks which, 
by construction, were considered extremely unlikely. 86  Third, the 
adoption of the IRB methodologies was not homogenous and similar 
operations corresponded to very different risk assessments and, thus, 
capital requirements. Finally, only largest banks fully benefited from 
capital reliefs associated with adoption of the most sophisticated IRB 
variant, i.e. the Advanced IRB, to calculate risk-weights for corporate 
exposures. 87  Instead, for corporate lending, banks tend to rely on 
parameters and models offered by regulators. These observations are not 
surprising: time is required to gather reliable datasets, develop stochastic 
analyses as well as to implement and fine-tune new governance 
                                                                                                                              
84 . See AN EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 83. Professor Black noted that meta-
regulation relies on regulated institutions having an appropriate culture of compliance and a 
correct set of incentives to pursue simultaneously public interest and private objectives. In a 
similar vein, regulatory authorities should have adequate skills to assess firms as well as 
“sufficient courage and political support to challenge them.” See Black supra note 84, at 1046. 
85. Alexander, supra note 81, at 346. 
86. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 601 (indicating also the IRB approaches are not 
tailored to reflect the differences in national laws). More generally financial economists have 
noted that the models prescribed by Basel II are flawed. Jon Danielsson, Blame the Models, 4 J. 
FIN. STABILITY 321, 326 (2008) (noting that the focus on small and frequent events to construct 
models to calculate capital charges leads to unrealistic assumptions over the likelihood and the 
impact of larger losses). 
87. Given the ability of IRBs to significantly reduce capital charges, their adoption is 
expected to increase in the European Union. See EUR. BANKING AUTH. (EBA), INTERIM RESULTS 
UPDATE OF THE EBA REVIEW OF THE CONSISTENCY OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS (2013). 
Whereas, in the United States, the adoption of IRB approaches is considered less permissive. See 
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 606. 
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approaches that have been re-defining the relationship between 
regulatory authorities and regulated entities.88 
To address (at least partially) the concerns with Basel II, the Basel 
Committee initiated a process of reforms that, following extensive 
negotiations, resulted in the adoption of Basel III.89 The necessity of a 
new accord to replace Basel II, became evident with the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, the adoption of Basel III occurred into two 
phases. Hence, certain elements of Basel III, primarily concerned with 
the level and the quality of regulatory capital, were adopted in 2011 and 
implemented starting from January 2013. The remaining elements were 
adopted in 2017, and they will progressively enter into force starting 
from 2022 with a full implementation scheduled in 2027.90 It follows 
that the dawn is still not an imminent event for Basel II. Moreover, Basel 
II, together with the changes introduced in 2011, constitutes the Basel 
framework that is currently in force in several jurisdictions, including 
across the European Union.91  
 The long gestation required to finalize Basel III and the prolonged 
implementation period signal the existence of contraposed interests. 
Notably, these were represented, on the one hand, by the necessity of 
limiting the use of internal models and, on the other hand, by the 
compliance costs that sudden limitations to the use of internal models 
would have had on banks relying on them. 92  Hence, different 
                                                                                                                              
88. On the benefits and limits of internal models, see Robert F. Weber, New Governance, 
Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models 
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, ADMINISTRATIVE L.R. 783, 860 (2010) (noting that 
for regulators the use of internal models is a tool to bridge the information asymmetry between 
banks and regulators). 
89. See supra note 13. 
90.  See supra notes 13 & 23 and accompanying texts. 
91 . Moreover, BASEL II is poised to be relevant for several years to come. The 
implementation of the new Accord is likely to occur first in developed economies, whereas the 
timing for phasing out Basel II – and Basel I – in the rest of the world remains uncertain.  
92. See supra note 23. Considering that in the European Union every bank is subject to the 
Basel Accords and that the adoption of IRB approaches is common among large European banks, 
authorities from EU Member States were reluctant to accept limitations to the use of internal 
models put forward by Basel III. Such limitations, in fact, are likely to result in an increase of  
regulatory capital for European banks. Differently, in the United States, limitations to the use of 
IRB approaches for large banks are already in place and small banks still rely on a version of 
Basel I to compute capital requirements. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 605. Through 
these lenses, it is possible to understand that the stall in the negotiations concerning the 
completion of BASEL III (see supra note 15) was resolved also through the concession of a long 
implementation period. 
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approaches have been developed, first, at the national level and, then, at 
the international level with the final adoption of Basel III.  
Limitations to the use of internal models have been, at first, 
introduced at the national level. In particular, the powers of national 
regulators to challenge the statistical models proposed by banks have 
been strengthened and regulators may impose more stringent criteria to 
ensure the reliability of banks’ own estimations. Further limitations are 
evident in the parameters adopted by national authorities to calculate 
capital charges for loans secured with real property. For instance, the 
Bank of England proposed more stringent parameters to calculate the 
risk-weight of residential mortgages under the IRB methodologies.93  
Such a trend reflects shared regulatory concerns over the dynamics 
leading to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, originated in the 
mortgage market. More generally, the use of internal models has been 
typically limited through two techniques. The first one consists in the 
establishment of floors, below which the IRB approaches cannot reduce 
capital charges. 94 As a result, the use of own estimations is constrained 
within parameters that are statutorily established for different operations. 
The second technique commonly used is termed “slotting” and consists 
of classifying financing operations into buckets, or slots, with varying 
risk weights.95 Depending on a series of mandatory criteria, banks are 
required to categorize each operation within a corresponding slot in 
order to calculate capital charges. Both techniques are featured in the 
final version of Basel III.96  
                                                                                                                              
94. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., BANK OF ENG., CONSULTATION PAPER: 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE RISK WEIGHTS 5 (2016), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/consultation-
paper/2016/cp2916.pdf?la=en&hash=6EACFA5B459ECB1FB8D06991F4C18E0DE66F33D4 
[https://perma.cc/WH9Q-Y84P] (archived Mar. 3, 2018). A similar approach has been followed 
by the Swedish Banking Supervisor (Finansinspektionen) in a memorandum expressly referred 
to the inability of internal risk models to capture (adequately) the risk related to mortgages, posing 
concerns for the stability of the Swedish market. See FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH. 
(Finansinspektionen), MEMORANDUM: RISK WEIGHT FLOOR FOR SWEDISH MORTGAGES 1 (2013), 
http://www.fi.se/contentassets/f1de28204ca048d1a780ca4d230fae1d/riskviktsgolv-svenska-
bolan-12-11920-21maj2014-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5H4-Z3LM] (archived Mar. 3, 2018). . 
94. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 304. 
95. See IRB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, at 2.  
96. For instance, see BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 38 (requiring banks that do not meet certain 
criteria to categorize their internal risk grades into five supervisory slots which specific risk 
weights). See also BASEL III, supra note 13, e.g., ¶ 147 (establishing a general twenty percent 
floor for collateralized transactions). 
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Although Basel III is built upon the structure introduced by Basel 
II, thus maintaining the three-pillar structure and the possibility to use 
internal models, the new Accord introduces a number of significant 
changes. Since its inception, Basel III has been characterized by a 
pronounced emphasis on the overall stability of the banking system with 
attention towards the interconnectedness of banks, the levels of liquidity 
and leverage, as well as the quality of regulatory capital to limit 
excessive risk-taking.97 With its finalization, the risk-sensitivity of the 
standardized approach to calculate credit risk and operational risk has 
been improved with the introduction of more uniform criteria and 
further granularity among classes of borrowers and categories of 
operations. 98  Moreover, the risk-weighted capital ratio has been 
accompanied by a reinforced leverage ratio, sustained by new capital 
floors applicable regardless of the methodology adopted. 99  These 
revisions have the practical effect of bringing the standardized and the 
IRB approaches closer to one another. The intent is, in fact, twofold and 
consists in increasing the flexibility in the calculation of capital charges 
while limiting methodological discrepancies across jurisdictions and 
among banks. 
Notwithstanding the amplitude and the depth of these changes, 
when it comes to personal property collateral, Basel III does not present 
any significant variations from the general framework established in 
Basel II. If anything, the stronger emphasis on liquidity that permeates 
                                                                                                                              
98. This is evident already from the changes introduced in 2011. See 
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 608-609; and Alexander, supra note 76, at 349. For a 
summary of the main changes introduced by Basel III, see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS (2017) 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5KH-KYL2] (archived 
Mar. 3, 2018) [hereinafter BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY]. 
98. For instance, the standardized approach of Basel II assigned a flat risk weight that was 
equal for every residential mortgage. Under the standardized approach put forward in Basel III, 
the risk-weightings for mortgages depend on the loan-to-value ratio of the mortgage, that is the 
amount of the loan divided by the value of the property; see BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 62. 
Moreover, a new risk-weighting has been introduced for exposures to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 43. In regard to operational risk, higher capital 
requirements apply to larger banks, as it is assumed that operational risk increases with a bank’s 
income, and to banks that have experienced greater losses due to operational failures, as they are 
considered more likely to suffer similar losses in the future. See BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL 
SUMMARY supra note 97, 8. 
99. The refined leverage ratio targets, in particular, systemically important banks that would 
have to ensure at any point in time a minimum level of equity, in addition to the risk-weighted 
capital ratio; see BASEL III, supra note 13, 140. In respect to the new output floor see BASEL III 
HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY supra note 97, 11. 
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Basel III reinforces the regulatory skepticism, further illustrated 
below,100 towards any collateral that is considered not sufficiently liquid 
and prone to depreciation in case of economic downturns. EU regulators 
and Member State authorities, following this trend, have substantially 
conformed to the Basel framework without prescribing any variation for 
the risk-weight parameters for transactions secured with personal 
property.101 
2. The Rationale for Capital Requirements: Regulating Risk 
Given that the Basel framework is crisis-driven, its rationale should 
be interpreted in the light of the core concerns that emerged from the 
global financial crisis, whereby banks – notwithstanding formal 
compliance with capital standards – experienced liquidity issues.102 The 
risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, together with multiple 
regulatory failures in addressing that occurrence, prompted national and 
international regulators to take a broader look at the dynamics of 
financial markets and to reassess the appropriate regulatory strategies to 
preserve financial stability.103 In banking regulation, the stance for more 
direct action to curb the risk of a systemic failure entails a more careful 
balance between the traditional micro-prudential focus, inherent in the 
Basel Accords, and macro-prudential regulatory tools, aimed at ensuring 
                                                                                                                              
100. In this Article reference to BASEL III is made only where relevant for comparative 
purposes, given that Basel II is still the current set of standards for capital requirements and that 
Basel III did not modify substantially the regime governing the treatment of personal property as 
collateral.  
101. With regard to the United Kingdom, regardless of terms defining its departure from 
the European Union, there is no indication that national regulators will not apply the provision 
enshrined in EU law, at least in the context of the risk-weight approach for loans secured through 
movable assets. In general, a disapplication of EU regulation may have direct consequences on 
the ability of British banking institutions to operate in the single market. For an analysis of the 
impact of various “Brexit” options on the financial service industry in the United Kingdom, see 
John Armour, Brexit and Financial Services 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY S54 (2017). See 
also Niamh Moloney, Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An Uncertain Future for The City? 
17 GERMAN L.J. 75 (2016). 
102. BASEL III (2011), supra note 13, ¶ 35. 
104. See generally FIN. SERVICES AUTH. (FSA), THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009); EU COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE HIGH 
LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU CHAIRED BY JACQUES DE LAROISIERE 
(2009). On the failures of various regulatory strategies, including those incentivizing the use of 
internal models, see Black, supra note 84, at 1037. 
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the stability of the banking system as a whole. 104  An effective 
illustration of the difference between these two regulatory functions is 
offered by a recurring metaphor according to which micro-prudential 
regulation is concerned with the health of the trees (individual banks) 
and macro-prudential regulation is the safeguard of the forest (the 
banking system as a whole).105 
In practical terms, micro and macro-prudential regulatory 
strategies may differ significantly. The former focuses primarily on 
“idiosyncratic risk,” which is the risk related to any specific operation. 
Given that idiosyncratic risks are, by definition, uncorrelated with one 
another and show little correlation with market risk, under a micro-
prudential approach, capital requirements curb individual risk-
exposures chiefly through diversification strategies. In contrast, under a 
macro-prudential approach, capital requirements are designed to address 
more directly the correlation among various risk-exposures. In 
particular, they are concerned with the mitigation of “systemic risk,” 
which is the likelihood that an event affecting one or more financial 
entities triggers financial instability. 106  The cyclical movements of 
                                                                                                                              
104 . Several assessments have been made to identify critical regulatory failures that 
emerged during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For an elevated perspective on the regulatory 
governance issues, see Black supra note 84. For a political economy perspective, see WHAT HAVE 
WE LEARNED? MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS (George Akerlof et al. eds., 2014). 
106. Rosa Maria Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS 
L.J. 197, 198 (2011) (focusing on the need for a special regime to resolve systemically relevant 
financial institutions, of SIFIs). For an early analysis indicating the necessity of combining micro-
prudential and macro-prudential regulatory tools, see Andrew D. Crockett, General Manager, 
Bank for International Settlements, Remarks at the Eleventh International Conference of Banking 
Supervisors: Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability (Basel, 
Sept. 20-21, 2000). 
106. Systemic risk is a multifaceted concept that, like its positive counterpart “financial 
stability,” has blurred contours. A joint report issued by the International Monetary Fund, the 
Bank for International Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board sets a commonly accepted 
definition indicating a systemic event as “the disruption to the flow of financial services that is (i) 
caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the real economy.” INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE 
TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND 
INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS–BACKGROUND PAPER 5-6 (2009). Professor Steven 
Schwarcz indicated that systemic risk should be understood as a specific type of tragedy of the 
commons that occurs because market participants are not incentivized to limit individual risk-
taking, notwithstanding the potential negative consequences on markets. Therefore, regulatory 
intervention is necessary and should be tailored to redress the incentive structure of financial 
institutions. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008). For an account of 
the primary issues related to systemic risk in the banking sector, see Olivier de Bandt et al., Philipp 
Hartmann & José L. Peydró, Systemic Risk in Banking After the Great Financial Crisis, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 
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markets and economies, the occurrence of diffused shocks and the 
failure of interconnected banks undermine risk-management strategies 
based on diversification. For instance, granting credit to a small business 
is a routine financing operation that presents a high level of idiosyncratic 
risk and a low level of systemic risk. The related credit risk is mitigated 
in a portfolio containing other (less risky) loans; thus the probability of 
non-repayment is higher than the probability that a default on that loan 
could generate a systemic shock. Yet, a phase of economic recession 
that simultaneously constrains the ability of a large portion of small 
businesses to repay their loans when due would impair the ability of the 
lender to meet its short-term obligations. Depending on the economic 
contingencies, a lack of sufficient liquidity may then ramify into 
systemic concerns. This sketch illustrates that the mitigation of credit 
risk may not alone curb the risk of banking or systemic failures. Given 
the maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-term 
investments, a bank may become insolvent due to insufficient liquidity. 
Hence, the Basel framework is particularly concerned with the 
maintenance of sufficient levels of liquidity of individual banks as well 
as within the entire banking system. 
The pivot of the risk-based approach of the Basel framework is 
represented by the coefficients to weigh capital charges against the 
levels of risks, in particular credit risk, associated with lending 
operations. Under the standardized approach, risk-weighted coefficients 
are defined by regulators and the possibility of considering factors 
mitigating credit risk is limited. For instance, small business loans are 
risk-weighted at seventy-five percent,107 and only security rights over 
highly liquid assets, such as bank accounts, may be considered to reduce 
credit risk and thus capital charges. Risk-weight coefficients feed into 
the capital adequacy formula and, assuming there are no other risk 
factors or surcharges, capital charges are calculated by multiplying: (1) 
the loaned amount, by (2) the risk-weight, by (3) eight percent. By way 
of example, a small business loan with a value of 100 requires a bank to 
hold capital equal to or greater than six. 
                                                                                                                              
2014). On regulating systemic risk in capital markets, see Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk 
Relevant to Securities Regulation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 941 (2010). 
107. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 69. Basel III has introduced a new risk weight for exposures 
to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Hence, when the new rules will enter into force, 
exposures to SMEs could either be subject to a treatment similar to the one currently in place, 
thus receiving a risk weight of seventy-five percent or, if not eligible, they could still receive a 
eighty-five percent risk-weighting. 
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Risk-weighted coefficients can be considered legal constructions 
that resemble statutory presumptions expressed in percentage terms of 
both the likelihood of repayment and the level of liquidity for different 
classes of financing operations and borrowers. The adoption of the IRB 
variants allows banks to adjust such a presumption. Under the IRBs, 
banks may determine the parameters for the calculation of capital 
charges by resorting to internal estimations over the probability of 
default and the resulting losses. The risks associated with a specific 
lending operation may be further mitigated, taking into account specific 
factors, such as the protection offered by a security right over tangible 
assets or receivables. However, in spite of their name, IRBs are 
governed by stringent regulatory prescriptions, according to which a 
security right in collateral may lead to reduced capital charges only if 
banks comply with specific regulatory requirements, as further 
examined in the next Section of this Article. Even more, as illustrated 
earlier, the finalization of Basel III has further constrained the use of 
IRBs.108 
From the above it emerges that the tension between secured 
transactions law and prudential regulation has profound roots. Secured 
transactions law aims at facilitating credit creation through private 
negotiations and under the assumption that credit risk is mitigated 
whenever security rights over collateral are taken. In this regard, secured 
transactions law, by focusing on the transactional dimension of security 
rights, is not concerned with systemic considerations nor does it delve 
into the connection between credit and liquidity risk. Prudential 
regulation is a crisis-driven, internationally-led regulatory framework 
designed to prevent banking failures and preserve the stability of the 
entire financial system. Stemming from this general rationale, capital 
requirements follow an operational logic that regulates banks from 
“within” in order to limit the level of risk taken by a particular bank as 
well as the risk accumulated in the entire banking system. Upon these 
premises, dissonances are expected when the rules governing security 
rights encounter the legal presumptions and the regulatory parameters 
established to compute capital charges; that is when the secured creditor 
is a regulated credit institution. 
                                                                                                                              
108.   See supra notes 93-96 and related discussion in the text. 
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III. DISSONANCES BETWEEN SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW 
AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
While any security instrument can be understood as a device to 
manage credit risk,109 different rules on creation, perfection, priority, 
and enforcement impact the credit protection effectively offered by each 
instrument. The legal treatment of a security right depends on either its 
legal nature, under legal regimes embracing a formalist approach, such 
as English law, 110  or its economic effects, under legal regimes that 
follow functionalism as the ordering principle, including those defined 
by UNCITRAL reflecting the North American experience.111 In legal 
systems deploying formalism, in which multiple categories of security 
rights coexist, the legal characterization of a security instrument is to be 
ascertained in order to determine the requirements for its creation, 
perfection, priority, and enforcement. By and large, the prudential 
regulatory framework neglects the granularity of national laws, focusing 
instead on specific legal and economic effects of a security right. 
Security instruments, together with other contractual mechanisms, are 
defined as Credit-Risk Mitigation (CRM) techniques. 112  CRMs are 
primarily designed to lessen the risks associated with individual 
financing operations and, overall, with the entire portfolio of financing 
operations of a bank. When CRM techniques are employed, the resulting 
risk-weighted capital charge should not be higher than that imposed on 
otherwise identical transactions that are not covered by credit 
protections.113 However, if providing inadequate credit protection, for 
                                                                                                                              
109. Castellano, supra note 28, at 617 (indicating that “the primary economic function of 
non-possessory secured transactions is to manage and mitigate credit risk without limiting the 
production capacity of the collateral and the debtor.”). 
110. A formalist approach is adopted in various European jurisdictions e.g., France and 
Italy, where multiple categories of security rights coexist and are statutorily defined. On the 
formalist approach, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 1-04. 
111. For a critical assessment of functionalism and formalism in secured transactions laws, 
see Michael G. Bridge et al., Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding the Law of Secured 
Transactions, 44 MCGILL L.J. 567 (1999). 
112. CRMs are defined as techniques whereby “exposures may be collateralized by first 
priority claims, in whole or in part with cash or securities, a loan exposure may be guaranteed by 
a third party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of credit risk.” BASEL 
II, supra note 12, ¶ 109; also restated in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 117. 
113. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 113. This principle is a mainstay for CRM and has been 
restated in SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 104 and ultimately codified 
also in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 119. 
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instance, due to insufficient value of the collateral, security instruments 
may result in capital charges that correspond to those applied to 
unsecured credit.114 In such circumstances, even though the security 
instrument could still be taken into account for the purpose of 
calculating banks’ economic capital, capital requirements effectively 
increase. 
From the foregoing discussion, it becomes apparent that the 
traditional narrative advocating that the use of collateral broadens access 
to credit by reducing its cost does not stand on firm ground. The sole 
existence of a security right over an asset, even though reducing credit 
risk, does not result per se in a reduced capital charge. In fact, while 
collateralized transactions are intended to offer credit protection, they 
also generate new risks, including legal risk, hindering the exercise of 
secured creditors’ rights; operational risk, arising from faulty 
procedures to monitor or evaluate collateral; and liquidity risk, arising 
from the difficulties in the disposal of collateral.115 A security right 
reduces a capital charge below the level of that applicable to unsecured 
loans only if it complies with prescriptive regulatory requirements 
ensuring the soundness of individual banks and the stability of the entire 
banking system. Thus, it is key to elicit such requirements. 
Under the Basel framework, to determine whether a given CRM 
technique corresponds to reduced capital charges, banks have to deploy 
specific procedures articulated either in the standardized approach or, if 
authorized by national regulators, in one of the two IRB variants. 
Subsequently, depending on the methodology adopted, various 
provisions apply to determine if a given type of transaction constitutes 
an eligible credit protection and its corresponding coefficient for the 
computation of the risk-weighted capital charge.116 In this context, the 
regulatory treatment of security rights over financial assets, receivables 
and tangible goods is examined and the implication of the lack of 
                                                                                                                              
114. There are some exceptions to this rule and in some instances non-eligible CRMs may 
also result in lower capital charges, as it occurs in the case of past due loans. See BASEL II, supra 
note 12, ¶ 77. Nonetheless, Basel III adopts a more conservative approach and only collateral and 
guarantees considered eligible for CRM purposes may be taken into account to lower capital 
charges. See BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 94. In any respect, the application of these exceptions 
does not affect the regulatory treatment of security rights here examined.  
115. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 115 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 122. 
116. This may occur in different fashions. In general, if a coefficient is not statutorily 
attributed to a specific operation, the risk-weight of the collateralized transaction results from the 
reduced exposure calculated after the CRM, multiplied by the risk-weight of the counterparty; 
BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 148 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 162. 
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coordination between secured transactions law and capital requirements 
is unveiled. 
A. The Regulatory Treatment of Secured Transactions 
The rationale and the inner logic of capital requirements are 
embedded in the requisites for eligible credit protections enshrined in 
the Basel framework and implemented in the EU by the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the CRR.117 The CRD IV and the 
CRR are essential components of the European Single Rule Book and 
apply to any bank operating in the European single market, extending to 
the European Economic Area. These two texts of EU secondary 
legislation – and, in particular, the CRR for the purpose of determining 
capital requirements – recurrently entrust the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) with the tasks of defining guidelines and drafting 
technical standards.118 The latter are then to be adopted by the European 
Commission through delegated or implementing acts, pursuant to 
relevant Treaty provisions and procedures. 119  The resulting level of 
legal harmonization substantially limits national discretion and offers 
grounds for a more accurate analysis of the regulatory treatment, under 
different methodologies, of the most common types of collateralized 
transactions. 
The CRR identifies two requisites for CRMs to mitigate credit risk 
and thus discount capital charges.120 First, assets have to be included in 
                                                                                                                              
117. CRD IV, supra note 14; CRR, supra note 14. 
118. In particular, the EBA, like the other European Supervisory Authorities, may draft 
Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Standards. See arts. 10 & 15 of 
Council Regulation 1093/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. L. 331/12. 
119. Notably under arts. 290 & 291 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (c. 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. On the 
regulatory powers of the EBA, see Paul Craig, Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon 
Settlement: Tensions and Strains, in RULEMAKING BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE NEW 
SYSTEM FOR DELEGATION OF POWERS 195 (Carl F. Bergström and Dominique Ritleng eds., 
2016). On the legal basis and powers of the European Supervisory Authorities, see Niamh 
Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1609 (2014); Elaine Fahey, Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections 
on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority, 74 MOD. L. REV. 581 (2011). 
120. The regulatory framework for CRMs is contained in BASEL II and their treatment is 
specified for each methodology. The framework is currently under revision following the SECOND 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23. The CRR already contains some of the proposed 
changes. 
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the list of “eligible collateral” contained in the CRR.121 Second, they 
have to be “sufficiently liquid” with a stable value over time. 122 
Moreover, banks should demonstrate – through written and independent 
legal opinions – that they have the right to liquidate (or retain) the 
collateral promptly in the event of the debtor’s default or insolvency in 
all relevant jurisdictions.123 The intent of these general provisions is to 
ensure that lower capital charges correspond to lower levels of credit 
and liquidity risk by focusing on the effective realization of the value of 
the collateral. The legal certainty and the enforceability of a security 
right are of paramount importance in this context. These principles 
permeate the bulk of provisions concerning different classes of 
collateral and types of transactions, and ultimately design a regulatory 
framework that privileges security rights on liquid assets, such as 
financial instruments, over less liquid tangible assets. 
Upon these premises, Article 197 of the CRR contains a list of 
eligible collateral, such as gold, cash and financial instruments 
deposited in accounts held by the lending institution extending the 
secured loan.124 In addition, cash on deposit or assimilated instruments 
that are “held by a third party institution in a non-custodial arrangement 
and pledged to the lending institution” may constitute eligible 
collateral.125 In taking this asset-specific approach, these provisions of 
the CRR do not take into account the practice of taking a security right 
over the entire business, which is common in English law (under 
floating charges) and contemplated by the EBRD Model Law in the 
form of an enterprise charge. The ability to evaluate, control and 
promptly convert collateralized assets into cash is a common feature of 
the listed assets. Hence, lending operations backed by these assets allow 
the curbing of credit risk while maintaining a sufficient level of liquidity, 
                                                                                                                              
121. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(3)(a). 
122. Id., art. 194(3)(b). 
123. Id., arts. 194(1) & (4). 
124. The list also includes a variety of equity and debt finance instruments, issued by 
governments and institutions rated by credit rating agencies authorized under EU law, listed in 
recognized stock-exchanges, or that qualify as senior debts. See CRR, supra note 14, art. 197. 
The blueprint of this list is put forward in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146. The CRR already 
encapsulates the proposed amendments advanced by the Basel Committee in the SECOND 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 132 and now codified in BASEL III, supra note 13 
¶ 148. 
125. CRR, supra note 14, art. 200(a). CRR arts. 200(b) & (c), also provides that “life 
insurance policies pledged to the lending institution” and “instruments issued by third party 
institutions which will be repurchased by that institution on request” may be used as eligible 
collateral. 
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given that the repayment of a loan is protected by assets that are either 
equivalent to or promptly convertible into cash.126 Moreover, some of 
these assets may be re-pledged by the secured creditor to secure its own 
borrowing, giving it an additional source of liquidity.127 It follows that, 
when a security right in these assets is established, a reduced capital 
charge is justified from a (micro and macro) prudential perspective. In 
the EU, these assets partially overlap with the legal category of 
“financial collateral” set forth in the FCD.128 In this respect, the FCD, 
by limiting legal formalities to establish and transfer financial collateral 
and by facilitating swift and efficient enforcement mechanisms in case 
of a debtor’s default or insolvency, 129  dovetails with the CRR and 
contributes to preserving financial stability through the maintenance of 
sufficient levels of liquidity in financial markets. 
Security rights over tangible assets and receivables may be 
considered in the computation of risk-weighted capital charges only 
under the IRB methodologies. Such an approach has been introduced 
with Basel II and it remained almost unaffected with the adoption of the 
final version of Basel III. The CRR establishes a series of detailed 
provisions that are regrouped here into two sets of requirements. The 
first set of requirements, enumerated in Article 209(3) of the CRR, 
defines the risk management procedures that banks must deploy in order 
                                                                                                                              
126. In line with BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146, the CRR defines a detailed set of 
approaches and methodologies to compute the impact of different forms of financial collateral on 
capital requirements. CRR art. 222 defines the “financial collateral simple method” to calculate 
capital requirements under the standardized approach; whereas CRR art. 223 sets out the 
“financial collateral comprehensive method” to be used under different methodologies. The list 
of eligible collateral considered here and contained in CRR art. 197 applies to all methods and 
approaches. 
127. FCD, supra note 37, art. 5(1). On the right of the secured creditor to use financial 
collateral under FCD, see GEOFFREY YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, YEOWART AND PARSONS 
ON THE LAW OF FINANCIAL COLLATERAL ch. 11 (2016). 
128. FCD, supra note 37, art. 1, ¶ 4(a), defines financial collateral as cash, financial 
instruments or credit claims. In the CRR, the treatment of financial collateral as credit protection 
is further specified under art. 207. However, the CRR is not limited to credit claims but recognizes 
a defined broader category of receivables (art. 199), further regulated under art. 209. On financial 
collateral, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶¶ 3.01ff. 
129. FCD, supra note 37, arts. 4 & 8. The FCD recognizes two fundamental remedies that 
may be exercised against financial collateral, namely the power of sale and appropriation, the 
former being most commonly used. See YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, supra note 128, ¶¶ 4-01 
& 12-06. 
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to benefit from reduced capital charges.130 Banks must conduct a regular 
assessment of the credit risk associated with receivables, including an 
evaluation of the credit practices adopted by the debtor.131 They must 
ensure that the difference between the amount of the exposure and the 
value of the receivables reflects the costs of enforcement and the risk 
associated with their concentration in the bank’s overall portfolio.132 
Encumbered receivables should also have a limited correlation with the 
solvency of the debtor.133 Moreover, certain forms of receivables, due 
to their nature, are simply considered ineligible for CRM purposes.134 
For security rights over tangible assets, termed “physical 
collateral,”135 the first set of requirements also relates to the ability of 
banks to manage the risks arising from their deployment with a 
particular emphasis on liquidity risk. Regulators are concerned with the 
processes that banks use to assess the value of given physical collateral 
in relation to the secondary market in which they can be liquidated.136 
Publicly available data on market prices, estimations of expected time 
and costs needed to dispose of the asset are required to both prove the 
existence of a sufficiently liquid market and assess the amount that is 
expected to be recovered.137 Although delegated acts may identify the 
types of physical collateral for which market and value conditions can 
be considered automatically met,138 the EBA communicated that there 
                                                                                                                              
130. The CRR provision mirrors BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 516-520. The provisions have 
been maintained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 290-294. 
131. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(a). 
132. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(b). 
133. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(c). 
134. These include receivables connected with securitizations, sub-participations and credit 
derivatives, and receivables from affiliates of the borrower, such as subsidiaries and employees. 
See CRR, supra note 14, arts. 199(5) & 209(3)(d). 
135. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(1)(c). 
136. These principles are also contained in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 521 & 522. In this 
regard, BASEL III largely retains these core requisites, with a relevant difference: national 
regulators lost the discretionary power to compile a list of collateral that are automatically 
considered to meet the market conditions to be treated as eligible collateral. See BASEL III, supra 
note 13, ¶¶ 295 & 296. This change, although it reflects the efforts of the Basel Committee to 
reduce national discrepancies, represents a further barrier to the use of personal property as 
collateral. 
137. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(6). Moreover, CRR art. 199(6)(d) provides that a bank 
should demonstrate “that the realised proceeds from the collateral are not below 70 per cent of 
the collateral value in more than 10 per cent of all liquidations for a given type of collateral.” This 
evidences the attention to the value of the collateral, which is determined in relation to market 
analyses. 
138. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(8). 
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are no types of collateral for which these conditions could be assumed, 
requiring banks to conduct case-by-case evaluations.139 Furthermore, 
banks are also required to demonstrate that they have procedures to 
monitor regularly and objectively any change in the value of the 
collateral. 140  As a further protection, the collateral must be insured 
against the risk of damage.141 These prescriptions lie outside the scope 
of secured transactions law. However, compliance with these 
requirements alone corners the parties’ autonomy, notably by limiting 
the level of risk banks may take if the security instrument is to reduce 
capital charges. As a result, banks may be dis-incentivized to enter into 
secured transactions or they may do so at a higher cost. 
The second set of requirements relates more directly to the features 
of the law governing secured transactions. In line with the necessity of 
ensuring effective credit protection, banks should assess and 
demonstrate, by means of independent legal opinions, the legal certainty 
of their rights over receivables and physical collateral.142 Specifically, 
the regulatory framework focuses on three central aspects, i.e. perfection, 
priority and enforceability in case of default. To provide eligible credit 
protection, a security right over these types of collateral (and the claim 
to proceeds deriving from their liquidation) should have priority over all 
competing claimants with the exception of statutory claims identified in 
national laws. 143  From the combined examination of the provisions 
defining the eligibility requisites for receivables and physical collateral, 
it emerges that a secured transactions regime should enable banks to 
enforce a security right swiftly. These general requirements set the 
guidelines for detailed rules that define narrow contours for a 
collateralized transaction to qualify as eligible credit protection and 
result in a reduced capital charge. 
                                                                                                                              
139 . See Rules and Guidance, EUR. BANKING AUTH., Rules and Guidance,  
www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/rules-and-guidance 
[https://perma.cc/6VDT-E4CC] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).  
140. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(c) & (g). 
141. Id. art. 208(5). 
142. Id. arts. 209(2)(c) & 210(a). 
143. Id. arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b). BASEL II, supra note 12, refers to the necessity of having 
first priority on collateralized transactions (in general) at ¶ 513, and on physical collateral at ¶ 
522. The same requisites are indicated in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶¶ 287 & 296. 
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B. The Interactions between Secured Transactions Law and Capital 
Requirements 
Capital requirements, in defining the requisites for credit 
protection, delineate a specific regulatory understanding of security 
rights. Such an understanding is consistent in several aspects to the one 
advanced in modern secured transactions laws. However, a series of 
inconsistencies emerge regarding the execution of security agreements, 
the rights and obligations of the parties, and the enforcement and 
publicity regime of security rights. 
First, the CRR and the Basel framework require the security 
agreement to contain a detailed description of the physical collateral;144 
thus implying that a detailed description is a proxy for exercising control. 
Such a requirement may be reasonable when the collateral is a discrete 
item of property, say, a piece of equipment, but could be rather 
cumbersome if the debtor is, for instance, a company that owns a variety 
of similar items. The assumption is that a detailed description would 
allow for a prompt identification of the collateral and its segregation 
from other assets that may either be unencumbered or subject to other 
security rights. Thus, theoretically, banks should enjoy greater control 
over physical collateral that can be readily identified and separated from 
other assets in the event of default. However, from a practical standpoint, 
a contractual formula identifying collateral as “all assets” or a 
description by type or category would achieve the same end in a more 
effective manner. Such descriptions, in fact, allow secured creditors to 
identify and take control of collateral upon default by circumventing the 
cost of a precise identification and expediting the enforcement of their 
right. It is for this reason that the UNCITRAL and EBRD Model Laws 
recognize that reference to “all assets” or to all movable assets within a 
category, suffices. 145  Similarly, English common law, the Belgian 
Pledge Act and the new provisions regulating the non-possessory pledge 
in Italy only require encumbered assets to be sufficiently identified or 
identifiable. 146  Accordingly, the CRR embraces a position that is 
discordant with a trend promoted by international soft-laws and 
embraced by national laws, in favor of an approach that considers 
                                                                                                                              
144. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(d) reflecting BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and, now, 
contained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 287. 
145. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 9; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 
44, art. 5.5. Contrast with U.C.C. § 9-108(c), under which “super-generic” collateral descriptions, 
such as “all assets,” are not sufficient. See also HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 45, at 150. 
146. On English law, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 2-05. In Belgium, see Belgian Pledge Act, 
supra note 30. In Italy, Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 32, art. 1(2). 
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encumbered assets in isolation, rather than considering them as part of 
a growing concern. In most cases, the sale of business as a whole would 
generate more value than an item-by-item disposal. The CRR effectively 
supplants national secured transactions law by establishing more 
stringent standards applicable to banks that seek to reduce capital 
charges. Nonetheless, such a position does not appear to be sustained by 
prudential concerns. If anything, a detailed description of the collateral, 
by inducing the parties to single out specific assets, limits the efficacy 
of such credit protections by increasing the costs of monitoring and 
enforcement, with a consequent surge in operational and legal risks. In 
contrast, generic descriptions allow banks to manage those risks more 
effectively. 
A second issue relates to the right granted to banks to conduct 
regular inspections of physical collateral.147 Secured transactions laws 
may specifically recognize such a right or may simply facilitate its 
exercise by leaving the definition of the manner in which inspections 
should be carried out to private negotiations.148 Under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, a secured creditor may inspect the collateral, but defers to 
the parties agreement to determine what would constitute a reasonable 
time for inspection and whether a prior notice is required.149 Other than 
providing for a security agreement to include a right to conduct regular 
inspection, the Basel Accords and the CRR are silent on how banks can 
effectively exercise such a right. On the one hand, the absence of 
specific provisions may be explained as an attempt to both concede 
some freedom to the parties and provide more room for maneuver to 
national laws. On the other hand, the CRR does not appear particularly 
concerned with the parties’ freedom, nor is it conscious of the variety of 
legal solutions offered by national legal regimes. In fact, capital 
requirements, in different circumstances reflecting their operational 
logic, overrule party autonomy with detailed prescriptions regarding 
banks’ risk-management processes.150 Therefore, reference to a right to 
                                                                                                                              
147. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(g) & (h); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and BASEL III, 
supra note 13, ¶ 287. 
148. See EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 15.4.3 (imposing no limitations on the 
right of the secured creditor to inspect collateral in possession of the debtor). Similarly, under the 
new Belgian regime, the secured creditor may inspect the collateral at any time. Belgian Pledge 
Act, supra note 30, art. 16. 
149. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 55(2). A similar disposition is also 
contained in the DCFR ch. IX, § 5.201(2). 
150. See, e.g., supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
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inspect merely restates a general principle hosted in most legal systems 
without adding much to solve a debate on how this right could (or 
should) be exercised, or whether a requirement to inform the debtor 
prior to any inspection would impair the effectiveness of the credit 
protection. The lack of such a provision – within a detailed regulation 
that is zealously concerned with the mechanisms that ensure monitoring 
of the value of collateral – appears to fall short of an essential element 
expected for the prudent management of credit risk. 
The juxtaposition of the provisions enumerating the eligibility 
requisites for receivables and physical collateral reveals enforcement 
mechanisms as a third area of dissonance between secured transactions 
law and capital requirements. As a general principle, capital 
requirements establish that banks should be able to swiftly enforce their 
rights by retaining or liquidating collateral in the event of the financial 
distress or insolvency of the debtor.151 For financial collateral, the CRR 
conforms to the provisions contained in the FCD whereby the 
enforcement of a security right over these assets should not be subjected 
to formal requirements.152 For security rights in receivables arising from 
commercial transactions, banks should have the right to dispose of them 
without needing the consent of the receivables obligors. 153  If the 
contract generating a receivable contains a clause banning any 
assignment – and such clause is recognized by the applicable law, as is 
the case under the English common law – a bank would be prevented 
from taking a security right in that receivable.154 A rule that overrides 
the contractual freedom of the parties to restrict assignment has become 
ubiquitous in various secured transactions laws, including the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.155 Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
                                                                                                                              
151. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(4). 
152. FCD, supra note 37, art. 3. 
153. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(2)(f); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 520 and BASEL III, 
supra note 13 ¶ 294. For the purposes of UCC Article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs, receivables 
obligors would be equated with account debtors. 
154. For a cogent critique of the issues posed by these clauses, see Hugh Beale, Louise 
Gullifer & Sarah Paterson, A Case for Interfering with Freedom of Contract? An Empirically-
Informed Study of Bans on Assignments, 3 J. BUS. L. 203 (2016). Clauses restricting assignments 
may be in the nature of a complete bar or a limited restriction, to the effect that assignment can 
only be to companies in the same group as the assignor. See Michael Bridge, The Nature of 
Assignment and Non-Assignment Clauses, 132 L.Q.R 57 (2016). 
155. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 13; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 
44, art. 5.4; DCFR ch. IX, § 2:104(2). All are not limited to receivables and provide that generally 
a security right may be created in an asset even if its owner has agreed not to transfer it. French 
and German laws also override contractual restrictions on assignments of receivables in 
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allows the secured creditor to collect encumbered receivables even 
before default with the consent of the grantor.156 For security rights in 
physical collateral, the Basel Accords and the CRR require banks to 
ensure that the value of the collateral may be realized within a 
reasonable timeframe. 157  The CRR does not prescribe any specific 
enforcement approach. Hence, as long as remedies are expeditious, 
whether through extra-judicial or judicial enforcement mechanisms or 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, they may satisfy the 
regulatory expectation for a security right to be realizable within a 
reasonable timeframe. This is in line with the position of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law that recognizes the importance of swift 
enforcement mechanisms.158 In contrast, the EBRD Model Law imposes 
formalities that may delay the enforcement beyond a reasonable 
timeframe by requiring registration of an enforcement notice and by 
suspending the final disposal of the collateral for at least 60 days after 
delivery of the enforcement notice to the debtor.159 
Fourth, with respect to priority, capital requirements are trenchant 
and essentially associate reduced capital charges only to security rights 
with first priority.160 The Basel Accords and the CRR do not prescribe 
any specific mechanisms to achieve highest priority, probably in 
consideration of the disharmonious solutions offered at the national 
level. 161  For instance, clear priority rules are commonly defined for 
security rights in the original collateral but they may be uncertain when 
the collateral is subsequently transferred, transformed or commingled. 
Due to the limited scope of application of the EBRD Model Law, the 
proceeds of collected receivables deposited in a bank account held with 
                                                                                                                              
commercial contracts. See Beale, Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 144, at 227ff. Belgian law 
similarly renders anti-assignment clauses ineffective against third parties. Belgian Pledge Act, 
supra note 30, art. 64. For Canada, see CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 113. Gilmore 
notes that even prior to the enactment of UCC 9, contract rights moved to being completely 
assignable at law. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 213. 
156. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 82. 
157. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(a). 
158. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 73(2). Belgian law also recognizes the 
ability of the secured creditor to enforce its rights extra-judicially as long as it proceeds in a 
commercially reasonable manner. See Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 30, art. 47. 
159. EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, arts. 33.1.6 & 24.1 (Supplementary Registration 
Statement) & art. 24.1 (Measures for Realisation of Charged Property). 
160. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b). 
161. See José M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes are the Same: The Distributional Question 
in International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459 (2011). 
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another financial institution have an uncertain priority status. 162 
Conversely, the UNCITRAL Model Law extends the priority status of a 
security right over receivables to their proceeds. 163  The clarity of 
priorities may be further clouded when preferential claims are not set 
forth in a manner that allows secured creditors to assess the hierarchical 
status of their claims. A secured transactions law that embraces the 
regulatory understanding of security rights as devices to mitigate credit 
risk should state any preferential claims affecting the priority of secured 
creditors. This is the position advanced by UNCITRAL.164  Such an 
approach appears to be a rarity, given that in most legal systems 
preferential claims are scattered in various legislative texts, often 
attesting to political considerations. This is evidenced by the diverse 
ranking of employees’ preferential rights across European legal 
systems.165 
A fifth issue that defines the concomitant application of these two 
branches of the law relates to filing requirements and its effects on 
security rights. Basel Accords and the CRR do not directly specify when 
a security right is perfected and what formalities should be met to 
consider a security instrument an eligible CRM.166 However, the EU 
regulatory framework governing “specialized lending” suggests a 
specific regulatory understanding of the function attributed to 
registration and filing requirements. Specialized lending comprises 
                                                                                                                              
162. The EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 5.10, extends the priority of the charge 
only to proceeds of an insurance policy on the charged goods. 
163. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 32; see also DCFR ch. IX, §§ 4:104-
4:105. 
164. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 34. Neither the EBRD MODEL LAW nor 
the DCFR contain a similar provision. 
165. In the United Kingdom, expenses of the administrators and employees’ claims – 
together with the prescribed part for unsecured creditors – have priority over floating charges but 
not over fixed charges. See Insolvency Act, supra note 53; Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.). In 
France, according to CODE DU TRAVAIL [C.TRAV.] art. L 3253-2, and CODE DE COMMERCE 
[C.COM] art. L 625-7 & L 625-8, the preferential rights of employees enjoy a super-priority claim 
over all claims, including security rights. In Italy, although the preferential rights of employees 
under art. 2751-bis of the CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] are subordinated to pledges, there is a plethora 
of preferential claims, scattered in various specialized provisions, which outrank certain 
categories of security rights. 
166. BASEL II refers, by way of examples, to the fact that registration may be a legal 
requirement. See, e.g., BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 123. This position is also maintained in the 
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 125 and has been ultimately codified in 
BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 140. The CRR does not contain any reference to registration in the 
context of non-possessory security rights, whereas it requires timely registration of a mortgage in 
art. 208(2)(a). 
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various financing operations to finance physical assets and for which the 
primary source of repayment is the income generated by those assets, 
including power plants, aircraft objects and various commodities 
inventories. 167  Without much consideration of the different national 
rules governing registration and perfection of non-possessory security 
rights, the EBA specifies, “[a] lien is perfected by registering it with 
appropriate statutory authority so that it is made legally enforceable and 
any subsequent claim on that asset is given a junior status.”168 Such a 
provision reflects common national and international secured 
transactions laws that impose registration as the only mechanism to 
perfect security rights in specific assets, like aircraft and immovable 
property.169 It also coincides with the general provisions on security 
rights in personal property as adopted in certain legal systems, including 
Belgium, France, Italy, as well as those countries following the EBRD 
Model Law.170 
Nonetheless, the idea that registration is the sole mechanism to 
both render security rights effective and govern their priority is not in 
line with the approach adopted in various secured transactions law 
regimes. Following a rigid interpretation, a security right that is 
                                                                                                                              
167. Eur. Banking Auth. (EBA), Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Assigning Risk 
Weights to Specialised Lending Exposures under Article 153(9) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 
(Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR) (EBA, Consultation Paper EBA/CP/2015/09, 2016). 
The final draft of this document is currently being examined by the European Commission for 
final approval. 
168. Id. at 34, n. 43. Emphasis has been added to highlight the term lien that appears to be 
used as a synonym of security interest. The quoted text is repeated throughout the document and 
is contained in the footnotes every time the locution “first perfected security interest” is used. 
169. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment ch. IV, Nov. 16, 2001, 
2307 U.N.T.S. 285; Roy Goode, Private Commercial Law Conventions and Public and Private 
International Law: The Radical Approach of the Cape Town Convention 2001 and Its Protocols, 
65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523, 526 (2016). 
170. According to the EBRD MODEL LAW, registration is a requisite to create one of the 
three types of charges, i.e. the “registered charge;” EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 6.1. 
In Italy, to establish a non-possessory pledge the agreement needs to be registered. Italian Non-
possessory Pledge Law, supra note 32, art. 1(4). However, there are other security instruments 
that do not require registration. For an overview, see Giuliano G. Castellano, The New Italian 
Law for Non-possessory Pledges: A Critical Assessment 9 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & 
FINANCIAL L. 542 (2016). In France, registration is often considered as a substitute for 
dispossession. See Rapport de Mme Cohen-Branche, Conseiller Rapporteur, Cour de Cassation 
(Assemblée Plénière), Nov. 6, 2009, no. 582 (08-17.095) [Report by Mrs Cohen-Branche, 
Reporting Judge, Court of Cassation (Plenary Assembly)]. In contrast, in Belgium, the parties 
may create an enforceable pledge upon execution of an agreement. Belgian Pledge Act, supra 
note 30, art. 2. 
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perfected without registration, or for which registration does not exclude 
the existence of entitlements with a higher priority – two common 
scenarios – may not lead to a discounted capital charge. For instance, 
under English law, registration does not govern priority; registered 
floating charges are subordinate to subsequently registered fixed 
charges (unless a negative pledge has also been registered with the 
floating charge) and, in trade finance, security rights are commonly 
perfected by taking possession of the bill of lading or other document of 
title.171 Hence, the classic English adage that states “fixed charge is for 
priority, floating charge is for control,”172 does not resonate with the 
concept of credit protection advanced in capital requirements, where the 
two elements, i.e. priority and control, should be concurrent rather than 
exclusive. In practice, this conceptual separation elaborated by English 
common law is circumvented by combining floating charges, fixed 
charges and negative pledges. However, resorting to multiple legal 
instruments increases legal risk, as compliance with several formal 
requirements should be ensured and interpretative doubts may arise.173 
Hence, the different treatment for fixed and floating charges, emerging 
from the necessity to balance the interests of different affected parties,174 
does not offer a prudentially sound legal solution. 
IV. THE UNFOLDING CONSEQUENCES 
Secured transactions law and capital requirements affect lending 
behaviors simultaneously. Although there are some difficulties in 
determining the exact impact of secured transactions law on the 
availability and cost of credit, 175  empirical analyses have found a 
                                                                                                                              
171. On floating charges, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. On perfection by taking 
possession of a negotiable document, including a bill of lading, see UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 
supra note 43, art. 26. 
172. Riz Mokal, Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges – The Separate Funds Fallacy, 
L.M.C.L.Q. 387, 397 (2004) (referring to Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004)). 
173. For instance, there were some concerns over the effectiveness of negative pledge 
clauses and whether registration of such clauses could be inferred as a sufficient notice rendering 
them effective against third parties. See PETER E. ELLINGER, EVA LOMNICKA & CHRISTOPHER V. 
HARE, ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW 849 (5th ed. 2011). The problem has been largely 
resolved by the Companies Act, 2006 (Amendment of Part 25), c. 46, Regulations 2013, no. 600 
(U.K.). See Louise Gullifer & Magda Raczynska, The English Law of Personal Property Security: 
Under-reformed?, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 271. 
174. See supra notes 50-54 and related treatise in the text. 
175. For a complete account of the most important findings in this field, see John Armour 
et al., How Do Creditor Rights Matter for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical Evidence, in 
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positive correlation between legal reforms facilitating secured 
transactions and availability of credit.176 However, mirroring the scant 
attention to the connection between secured transactions law and 
prudential regulation, these studies – ascribed to the “law and finance” 
stream of literature – primarily focus on the correlation between 
enhancements in the protection of creditors’ rights and access to external 
finance. 177  Similarly, the banking industry associates a reduction of 
credit availability and economic growth with the introduction of tighter 
capital requirements – thus implying a tension between economic 
growth and financial stability as earlier discussed. 178  Nonetheless, 
official and independent studies confute this position, stressing that the 
long-term benefits of a more stable banking system to stimulate lending 
and sustain growth.179 How credit is distributed in accordance with legal 
systems that have modernized their domestic secured transactions laws 
while implementing capital requirements is empirically untested. 
Drawing from the analysis conducted thus far, it is possible to advance 
several significant considerations on the broader consequences of an 
increased availability of credit in jurisdictions deploying international 
capital standards for banks, with the intent to further empirical analyses. 
While capital requirements apply exclusively to regulated credit 
institutions, secured transactions laws allow any individual or entity to 
act as a secured creditor. It stands to reason that the implementation of 
a reformed secured transactions law is more likely to benefit those 
                                                                                                                              
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURED FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 3 (Frederique 
Dahan ed., 2015). 
176. It has also been noted that secured transactions law reforms have a greater positive 
impact on the availability of credit than insolvency law reforms. Id. at 13. See generally Rainer 
Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 549 
(2009). 
177. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
FIN. 1131 (1997); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113-40 
(1998). More sophisticated analyses in this field consider a broader range of protections given to 
creditors. See generally John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-
Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 
(2009). 
178. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
179. Different studies note that an increase of capital requirements has minimal negative 
impact on global GDP. See, e.g., Patrick Slovik & Boris Cournède, Macroeconomic Impact of 
Basel III (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 844, 2011); See also ADMATI & 
HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5. At the national level, see Jonathan Bridges et al., The Impact of 
Capital Requirements on Bank Lending (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 486, 2014). 
 
50                 41(3) FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 531 (2018) 
lenders that are not affected by banking capital regulation, such as 
micro-lenders, leasing and factoring companies. Rather than 
understanding limited access to credit exclusively in terms of 
shortcomings in security rights regimes or as a consequence of capital 
requirements,180 the documented reluctance of banks to take personal 
property as collateral should be explained also (if not primarily) as a 
function of the lack of coordination between the legal and the regulatory 
frameworks under which banks manage credit risk. The provisions on 
eligible collateral clearly prioritize financial instruments and receivables, 
limiting banks’ appetite for other collateral. For instance, security on 
intellectual property rights, promoted by UNCITRAL through a special 
set of recommendations,181 may constitute an effective credit protection 
only in limited circumstances, given the intrinsic difficulties in assessing 
their value. In a similar vein, the suspicious attitude towards physical 
collateral in the Basel framework should be ascribed to the inherent 
concerns about their valuation and liquidity.182 Historical data on the 
variety of tangible assets that may be taken as collateral is often 
unreliable or non-existent. Furthermore, even when reliable data can be 
sourced, the value of tangible assets tends to be more directly correlated 
with the borrowers’ ability to repay their obligations and with the 
general economic conditions. Tangible assets are likely to suffer 
                                                                                                                              
180. The first position is often advanced by international organizations; e.g., INT’L FINANCE 
CORP. (IFC), SECURED TRANSACTIONS SYSTEMS AND COLLATERAL REGISTRIES 6-7 (2010). In 
the literature, see, e.g., Mehnaz S. Safavian, Firm-Level Evidence on Collateral and Access to 
Finance, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 119 (Frederique Dahan 
& John Simpson eds., 2008). On the idea that capital regulation limits economic growth, see supra 
note 17 and accompanying text. 
181. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2010); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 1(3). On the relevance of security interests 
in intellectual property (IP) within current social and economic frameworks, see SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2017) (examining several critical 
aspects, such as the relevance of IP rights and debt financing for SMEs, cross-border and 
international rules for taking, perfecting, and enforcing security in IP). For a forward-looking 
analysis concerning future legal developments to facilitate the use of IP licenses as collateral, see 
Andrea Tosato, Security Interests over IP Licenses: Comparative Observations and Reform 
Suggestions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2018). For an early and critical 
investigation of legal frameworks allowing the use of software copyright as source of (secured) 
financing, see KIRIAKOULA HATZIKIRIAKOS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: SOFTWARE AS COLLATERAL (2006). 
182. See David Clementi, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Financial Services 
Authority Conference: Risk Sensitivity and the New Basel Accord (Apr. 10, 2001). 
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depreciation, either as a result of the borrower’s default or as a reflection 
of the cyclical movements of the economy. 
Against this backdrop, reforming secured transactions laws is not 
sufficient to broaden access to bank credit. Furthermore, the benefits 
(financial stability and increased access to credit) sought by prudential 
regulation and secured transactions must be measured against the 
simultaneous application of their dissonant logic when they intersect, i.e. 
when banks are secured creditors. The requisites for credit protection to 
reduce capital charges naturally constrain the ability of banks to take a 
number of assets as collateral and incentivize them to re-allocate their 
resources to less risky, therefore less capital intensive, activities.183 The 
banking industry’s retraction from these lending operations results in a 
vacuum that is filled by non-bank operators that are not subject to capital 
requirements. Loans provided by non-banks often involve collateral and 
borrowers that are deemed too risky for regulated credit institutions. 
Through the introduction of a more favorable legal regime, borrowers 
previously excluded from the credit market are more likely to receive 
credit, even if at higher interest rates. It follows that by adopting a 
modernized and simplified legal regime for taking security rights in 
collateral, access to secured credit may be broadened; but its cost is not 
necessarily reduced as a result of a greater involvement of non-bank 
operators. This intuition is corroborated by empirical studies that 
register an increase in interest rates in connection with collateralized 
loans.184 
                                                                                                                              
183. A limited supply of commercial loans by large European and U.S. banks was noted 
during the period preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 31 (2008). More recently, the retraction of the largest US banks 
from the market of small business financing has been noted by Brian Chen, Samuel Hanson & 
Jeremy Stein, The Decline of Big-Bank Lending to Small Business: Dynamic Impacts on Local 
Credit and Labor Markets (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 2017), 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/BigBankSmallBiz_paper_20170905_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8S6V-W626] (archived Mar. 4, 2018). Furthermore, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) indicated that a large portion of SMEs financing in the United States and in the European 
Union is offered by non-banking institutions; see Economic Bulletin - Trends in the External 
Financing Structure of Euro Area Non-financial Corporations (Eur. Cent. Bank, Frankfurt, 
Germany), June 2016, at 29. 
184. See, e.g., Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A 
Study of Defaults in France, Germany and the UK, 63 J. FIN. 565 (2008); James R. Booth & Lena 
C. Booth, Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs, 38 J. MONEY CREDIT & 
BANKING 67 (2008); Sheng-Syan Chen, Gillian H. Yeo & Kim W. Ho, Further Evidence on the 
Determinants of Secured Versus Unsecured Loans, 25 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 371 (1998). 
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If stimulating the development of unregulated credit markets is an 
unintended effect of the interaction between these two branches of the 
law, significant policy concerns emerge. Following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, it became clear that the Basel framework, while limiting 
excessive risk-taking, failed to impede the diversion of banks’ capital 
towards (more risky) operations outside the regulatory perimeters,185 
thus rendering the financial system more fragile and regulatory 
strategies less effective. A core problem affecting the Basel framework 
was – and still is – represented precisely by the inadvertent implications 
caused by the common assumption of the coefficients used to determine 
capital charges.186 In fact, pursuant to the risk-weighting logic of Basel 
II, certain assets, such as residential mortgages (and derivative products 
based on them), were subject to lower capital requirements than other 
investments, like corporate borrowings.187 As a consequence, banks had 
strong incentives to invest in those assets in order to reduce their capital 
charges.188 Furthermore, the low level of capital required to engage in 
those investments increased banks’ leverage, increasing returns as well 
as risk exposures. These distortions in relation to residential mortgages 
have been partially addressed at the national level. 189  Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                              
185. Black, supra note 84, at 1058 (noting that the 2007-2008 financial crisis revealed, inter 
alia, a fundamental misalignment between the incentives of regulators, regulated entities, and 
other firms operating in financial markets). 
186. See generally, Romano, supra note 11. Capital regulation incentivizes banks to invest 
in activities that are less risky, given that they cost less in terms of capital. Therefore, the 
attribution of different risk-weightings and the processes to calculate capital charges shape 
lending behaviors by determining banks’ preferences. See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit 
Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6. When capital regulation is 
perceived as a cost, banks may engage in practices of regulatory capital arbitrage, that is, the 
exploitation of the “differences between a portfolio’s true economic risks and the notions and 
measurements of risk implicit in regulatory capital standards;” David Jones, Emerging Problems 
with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING 
& FINANCE 35, 40 (2000). On this phenomenon, see also Erik F. Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank 
Capital: Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2016). 
187. For a convincing illustration in the context of the financial crisis, see Romano, supra 
note 11, at 13 (indicating that “a bank had to hold only $4 in capital for every $100 in residential 
mortgages, but it had to hold an even lower $1.60 for every $100 in MBSs with an investment 
grade”). 
188. For a discussion of the unintended consequences of the Basel framework, see Viral V. 
Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83 (Viral A. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 
2009); Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper 
No. 392, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168006.  
189. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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international capital requirements still dis-incentivize banks to accept 
personal property as collateral, 190  whereas secured transactions law 
promotes their use. 
The problematic nature of this diversion is represented by the 
phenomenon of “shadow banking,” which is the activity of credit 
intermediation occurring completely or partially outside the banking 
system. 191  In this respect, shadow banking has been eloquently 
described as a “shadow caused by the regulatory spotlight shining 
elsewhere.”192 A parallel may be drawn with the regulatory limelight 
that, through the eligibility criteria for collateral, points towards specific 
types of security instruments and collateral, leaving other forms of 
transactions and assets in the shadow of unregulated financial 
institutions, which may fully enjoy reformed secured transactions laws. 
This dynamic emerges vividly from the experience of the People’s 
Republic of China. In 2007, the country reformed its law pertaining to 
secured transactions to facilitate the creation and enforcement of 
security rights in accounts receivable, and equipment financing.193 Prior 
to the enactment of the new law, factoring and leasing products were 
largely unavailable. The establishment of a new legal framework and a 
registry system maintained by the national central bank, The People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), significantly stimulated the growth of the 
leasing and factoring industries. 194  Simultaneously, the uncontrolled 
                                                                                                                              
190 . For a comparison of the risk-weighting attributed to secured lending and credit 
derivatives, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory 
Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that through a credit derivative, a commercial, unsecured loan 
may require the same amount of capital that is required if that very same loan were secured by a 
Treasury bond issued by the US government; whereas, commercial loans secured with personal 
property do not benefit from such a straightforward reduction of capital). 
191. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW 
BANKING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD 1 (2011). 
192 . Julia Black, Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the 
Cognitive Framework from the Economic to the Social 47 (London Sch. Econ., Legal Studies 
Working Paper No. 24/2013, 2013). 
193. Property Law of the PRC (promulgated by Fifth Sess. of the Tenth Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), No. 62 P.R.C. LAWS, Part IV (regulating security 
interests in personal property). 
194 . DALBERG, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE IFC SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
ADVISORY PROJECT IN CHINA 33-34 (2011) (noting that in China, “[t]he value of factoring grew 
from 2.6 billion Euros in 2003 to 67.3 billion Euros in 2009, according to data from Factors Chain 
International” and that the implementation, in 2009, of a registry for financial leases propelled the 
development of that portion of the secured credit market). 
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growth of debt accumulation outside the traditional banking system is, 
in China and elsewhere, one of the primary sources of concern. 195 
From the above, it appears that capital requirements contribute to 
shaping a market for secured credit in which assets or transactions 
deemed too risky to serve as eligible credit protection are instead 
employed by non-bank institutions. Whether the development of this 
form of credit outside the banking system is beneficial or poses a 
systemic threat depends on a number of factors.196 Shadow banking 
activities in the form of asset-based lending, factoring and leasing, or 
even online lending, 197  are means to increase liquidity in the real 
economy and promote growth. 198  However, the uncontrolled 
development of this phenomenon poses serious risks. Since shadow 
                                                                                                                              
195 . See Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking and Regulation in China and Other 
Developing Countries 4 (Duke Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Series 2017-8) 
(indicating the reluctance of banks to lend to SMEs as one of the factors fomenting the 
development of shadow banking in China). See also Dan Awrey, Law and Finance in the Chinese 
Shadow Banking System, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (noting that regulatory 
interventions set the stage for the development and rapid growth of the Chinese shadow banking 
system). For a broader perspective of the stability concerns in the regulatory framework, see 
Emilios Avgouleas & Duoqi Xu, Overhauling China’s Financial Stability Regulation: Policy 
Riddles and Regulatory Dilemmas, 4 ASIAN J. OF L. & SOC. 1 (2017) (indicating the connection 
between the Chinese banking sector and shadow lenders as a primary concern). 
196. Professor Schwarcz analyzed the efficiencies and the market failures brought by the 
shadow banking system and noted that regulation might attempt to control some of those failures, 
but cannot eliminate them completely. However, regulation to limit the potential systemic threats 
primarily require the reduction of opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 638 (2012). See also Erik F. 
Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins (Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 (noting the connection between shadow banking and capital 
arbitrage); Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo & İnci Ötker-Robe, Chasing the Shadows: How 
Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets? 3 (World Bank, Economic Premise No. 88, 
2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP88.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/78GK-7KAM] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (indicating excessive leverage and an 
amplification of pro-cyclicality, among the primary concerns posed by shadow banking to the 
stability of the financial system). 
197. According to Morgan Stanley, in 2014 US online lenders originated US$12 billion in 
loans; Can P2P Lending Reinvent Banking?, MORGAN STANLEY (June 17, 2015), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/p2p-marketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/C6YV-
L9AL] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); Todd Baker, Marketplace Lenders are a Systemic Risk, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-risk. Dirk A. 
Zetzsche et al, From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 
14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2017) (indicating that through a trial-and-error process 
online lending platforms are perfecting their algorithms in order to measure the levels of risk of 
small borrowers who, in turn, are considered too risky by international banking regulation). 
198. Ghosh et al., supra note 197, at 3. 
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banking institutions are highly leveraged, they are easily affected by 
cyclical movements in the value of collateral and are prone to liquidity 
shortages and defaults. Moreover, regulated banks are often part of the 
shadow-banking chain, to which they provide (directly or indirectly) 
funds, often by acquiring loans originated by shadow lenders. 199 
Therefore, depending on the dimension of the non-banking market and 
its connection with the banking system, systemic concerns may arise 
and, more generally, an uncontrolled accumulation of debt may lead to 
financial instability, as Minsky noted.200 
The concomitant application of these two branches of law leads to 
two intertwined consequences. First, the effectiveness of secured 
transactions law reforms is curtailed by a regulatory framework that 
requires credit institutions to treat loans secured by collateral in the same 
guise as unsecured credit. Second, the availability of credit is fueled by 
financial institutions operating outside the banking system. Hence, the 
uncoordinated intersection of secured transactions laws and capital 
requirements, rather than their discrete application, hinders both access 
to credit and financial stability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While equally concerned with the management of credit risk, 
secured transactions law and prudential regulation follow distinctive 
rationales and operational logics. The legal regimes governing security 
rights balance the antithetic interests of the parties affected by those 
rights. Within the boundaries imposed by such a balance, secured 
creditors and debtors enjoy significant freedom in negotiating the terms 
of their security agreement. In addition, valuation of the collateral, 
determination of the amount lent against its value, the frequency and 
mechanics of inspections and the general creditworthiness of a loan 
                                                                                                                              
199. Many shadow banking activities are conducted under the auspices of bank holding 
companies. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the 
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applicant are not a matter of secured transactions law. Conversely, 
prudential regulation, through capital requirements, controls the risk 
associated with banking activities. Hence, for the purpose of reducing 
capital charges, regulatory provisions recognize security rights as a valid 
form of credit protection only when they are deemed to curb the risks of 
failure of individual banks and promote the stability of the financial 
system. To wit, balancing the interests of the parties affected by a 
security instrument do not necessarily lead to rules – on creation, 
perfection, priority, and enforcement of security rights – that 
accommodate the interests of public regulation. 
The regulatory treatment of security rights over receivables, 
financial collateral and tangible assets reveals the depth of the 
dissonances between secured transactions law and capital requirements. 
These dissonances, in turn, have broad policy implications. In this 
respect, the assumption that reforming the law pertaining to security 
rights increases access to credit, by reducing its costs, is questionable. 
An uncontrolled accumulation of debt outside the banking system is 
ultimately stimulated when secured transactions law – facilitating credit 
creation – and capital requirements – limiting banks’ appetite for certain 
types of security instruments and collateral – are applied concomitantly 
and in an uncoordinated fashion. As a result, availability of credit 
remains constrained and stability concerns emerge. Resolving these 
dissonances requires more than a mere attentiveness in legal drafting. 
International standard-setters and national law-makers should 
reconsider the policy aims and the beneficiaries of secured transactions 
law and prudential regulation, having in view that these two branches of 
the law intersect. 
